

JPRS 83665

13 June 1983

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1774

FBIS

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13 June 1983

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ARMED FORCES

COMBAT POTENTIAL, READINESS VIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 15-21

[Article, published under the heading "For Classes Within the Officer Marxist-Leninist Training System," by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor Col A. Dmitriyev: "Combat Potential and Combat Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces"*)]

[Text] Our party inalterably and persistently stresses two interrelated aspects of its policy: dedication to the cause of preserving and strengthening peace and the necessity of a determined defense of the achievements of socialism, strengthening of the defense capability of the USSR and the entire socialist community.

As CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted in his report entitled "60th Anniversary of the USSR," "Each and every step along the road toward strengthening peace has been and is difficult, requiring an intensive struggle against the imperialist 'hawks.' It has become particularly aggravated today, when the most militant groupings have become more active in the West, groups whose class hatred toward socialism gains the upper hand over a sense of reality, and sometimes over common sense as well." For this reason unabating vigilance and strengthening of the defense might of the brother socialist countries is essential. "...We shall never permit," stressed Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "our security and the security of our allies to be threatened."

Accomplishment of this important task demands of military cadres a profound understanding of the sources of the defense might of the Soviet State and the structure of the combat potential of its Armed Forces. It is essential clearly to see the interlinkage between the elements of combat potential and combat readiness and to know the conditions of their transformation into decisive and effective actions to repulse any aggressor.

* It is recommended that this article be used in studying the topic "The 26th CPSU Congress on Further Increasing the Combat Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and Their Combat Potential."

* * *

The Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress formulated a thesis which is of paramount significance for military theory and practice: "A solid fusion of a high degree of technical equipment, military expertise and indomitable morale -- this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 66).

In order thoroughly to understand the content of this externally very simple thesis, it is necessary first of all to comprehend the nature of combat potential, to elucidate its structure, the conditions and sources of its formation, and its place in the overall system of defense might of the state.

One can make the following brief statement regarding historical conditions: establishment of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening of their combat potential are dictated by the entire course of development of the world's first toiler state and by the need to defend it against hostile intrigues and direct aggression by international imperialism.

The material and spiritual sources of formation and development of the combat potential of the army and navy are rooted in the overall might of the socialist state, in the advantages of our social system, our economy, politics, and ideology. The Soviet socialist societal and governmental system, the indissoluble alliance of the worker class, peasantry and intelligentsia, and the friendship of the Soviet peoples; a highly-developed planned, socialist economy; Marxist-Leninist ideology, which prevails in society, the excellent morale and high degree of socialist awareness of the masses; the achievements of Soviet science -- all this forms specific elements of this country's defense potential, and through it directly affects the combat potential of the Armed Forces.

In specifying these principal sources, one should not ignore those which express the profound link between society and nature. They include population -- population size, density by regions, rate of growth, ethnic composition, structure by sex and age, etc, as well as natural-geographic conditions -- location and size of the territory of the state, nature of the terrain, climate, existence of minerals and other resources. It is quite obvious that consideration of the geographic factor, manpower and natural resources is important not only from a purely economic but also from a military standpoint.

We must note that in CPSU documents, in statements by party leaders and government officials, and in our military-theoretical literature the terms "military power," "defense might," and "defense potential," applied to the socialist state, are employed as equivalents. In any case it is usually defined as that portion of material and spiritual-intellectual resources, those actually mobilized and maximum capabilities of a country which can be utilized to accomplish military-political tasks and to defend peace and the achievements of socialism. Stress is deliberately placed on the word "defense."

The military power of any state possesses a class-political nature, is created and utilized in the spirit of the predominant military-political doctrine. The military power of the Soviet State serves the interests of the worker class and the toiler masses, for it is directed toward thwarting the aggressive schemes of

imperialism, at preventing a world war, and at defending the achievements of socialism. It is fully in conformity with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine and therefore is correctly viewed as defensive.

In characterizing the military power (defense potential) of the USSR, one usually distinguishes economic, social, spiritual (or moral-political), and scientific potentials, as well as "military potential proper." We must note, however, that not all economic potential goes directly into defense potential, but only a certain portion -- military-economic potential. In like manner one considers first and foremost the military aspects of social, spiritual, and scientific potential.

Military-demographic potential is named with increasing frequency in contemporary military-theoretical literature as an independent element of defense might. Finally, when one speaks of "military potential proper," one has in mind primarily the Armed Forces and their combat power, their combat potential.

Taking these comments into account, the structure of defense potential can be presented as follows. Its main element is military-economic potential -- that part of the economy which directly provides for the defense needs of the state, as well as its mobility and capability to switch over to performing wartime tasks.

Defense might is also influenced by social potential, first and foremost by the strength of the societal and governmental system in the face of war ordeals. The class unity and friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the political system of our society, rule by the Soviets, the interaction of governmental and public organizations, and guidance by the Communist Party ensure effective defense of the socialist homeland.

The spiritual resources of the masses, particularly their attitude toward war and peace, toward the army and the cause of defense of the homeland, their readiness and willingness to defend revolutionary achievements with weapon in hand are an essential element of the defense might of the socialist nation.

Defense might also depends on the degree of development of military-scientific potential -- advances in the natural, technical, social, logical-mathematical sciences in their military significance. An important role is played not only by achieved results but also by existing scientific backlogs or leads, new ideas and solutions of an applied military nature.

Military-demographic potential determines the state's mobilization capabilities as regards manpower resources. It is that part of the population which does or can take part in performing defense tasks -- serving in the Armed Forces, working in the defense industry, in other branches supplying military needs, comprising first and second level reserve, etc.

As regards natural-geographic conditions, their military significance most directly reflect the character of the probable theater of military operations, the availability and abundance of natural resources of defense significance, especially energy resources. Natural conditions can strengthen defense potential, and can weaken it with an unfavorable combination.

All the above-named elements of the defense potential of the socialist state are direct sources of formation and development of "military potential proper," which in the main is embodied in Armed Forces combat potential. Since it occupies a special place among the components of defense might, it cannot be viewed as "one of" the potentials, in a common line with the other ones. We must stress that the combat potential of the army and navy comprises the nucleus of our country's defense potential and most directly and effectively expresses its essence. Another specific feature of combat potential is the fact that it comprises a fusion, a synthesis of the main content of all the other elements of military power and embodies this content in a special military organization.

Examination of the nature and sources of formation of the combat potential of the Armed Forces makes it possible to evaluate its content in a more practical manner and to elucidate its internal link with combat readiness.

* * *

Let us once again return to the thesis formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress. It clearly delineates the three main components of Soviet Armed Forces combat potential. The first of these embraces the material-technical aspect -- quantity and quality of weapons and equipment, which determine the firepower, strike, and maneuver capabilities of the Armed Forces. The two others characterize the human factor, that is, quantity and quality of personnel: on the one hand, combat proficiency, the ability of personnel skillfully to utilize weapons and equipment, to operate confidently in battle, and on the other hand -- their excellent morale, political awareness, and psychological firmness.

These three components express the very essence of combat potential and its main content. USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov draws the attention of commanders, political agencies, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all personnel to their primary and immediate development.

It is important to bear in mind that we are speaking here not about a simple sum of the listed characteristics but about their system, a solid fusion in which each component influences and amplifies the other. We know that weapons and equipment are merely lifeless objects without human operators possessing the needed knowledge and skills. In turn, even people who are quite knowledgeable in military affairs cannot fully realize their potential if their morale is poor.

Combat potential is also characterized by other indicators, particularly by organizational structure of the Armed Forces, its conformity with equipment, personnel, tasks being accomplished, fundamental regimentation of the activities of troops and naval forces, and the degree of discipline of military personnel. Organization and effectiveness of all training and combat activities of the Armed Forces in turn depend to a substantial degree on development of command and control systems, on the quality of training of officer cadres, and their skill in leading troops. An important role is also played by the structure of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, the activities of which are directed toward increasing the awareness and activeness of personnel in performing their military duty, toward strengthening discipline,

and toward forming excellent moral-political and fighting qualities of servicemen.

Development of combat potential and its embodiment in actual Armed Forces combat power require diversified scientific support. V. I. Lenin's statement that "without science it is impossible to build a modern army...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 183) is more meaningful today than ever before. The achievements of all sciences serve these objectives. The achievements and capabilities of military science as a system of specialized knowledge of the mechanisms of organizational development of the army and navy, their preparation for war and the conduct of warfare are a direct element of combat potential. Just as science as a whole is increasingly becoming a direct productive force, military science is increasingly more actively influencing strengthening of Armed Forces combat power and combat readiness.

Finally, the combat potential and combat power of the army and navy depend most directly on the level of their logistic support, on the effectiveness of operations of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services.

In its full extent, combat potential encompasses all the elements which characterize Armed Forces combat power. Thus these terms virtually coincide in their scope and content. Both reflect those material and spiritual capabilities possessed by the Armed Forces for performing their assigned function -- reliable defense of the socialist homeland, the USSR and, together with the brother armies, of the entire socialist community and the international achievements of socialism.

The Communist Party plays a decisive role in development and strengthening of the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces. CPSU leadership embraces all aspects and areas of military organizational development -- from its ideological-theoretical substantiation to accomplishment of the practical tasks of increasing the war-fighting capability and combat readiness of troops and naval forces. The party formulates military policy, including military-technical policy, shapes the military doctrine of the Soviet State, and determines the principles and paths of Armed Forces organizational development. It takes all necessary measures to furnish the army and navy with highly effective modern equipment, directs the improvement of their organizational structure, command and control systems and methods, and determines the objectives, ways and means of training and indoctrinating personnel. The CPSU displays continuous concern with training highly-skilled officer cadres who are dedicated to the cause of communism, with stepping up the activities of political agencies and party organizations, and strengthening the morale of troops and naval forces. In response to this concern, Communists and Komsomol members as well as all army and navy personnel are working selflessly in all areas of military affairs, strengthening the combat potential of the Armed Forces and seeking to achieve a continuous high level of Armed Forces combat readiness.

* * *

Combat power and combat potential are initial characteristics which reflect the available and maximum capabilities of the Armed Forces, the composition and magnitude of those material and spiritual elements which can be mobilized in

case of war. There still exists another characteristic, however, and a most important characteristic at that, without which these elements cannot be brought into action. This characteristic is combat readiness -- the concrete status of Armed Forces units, warships and combined units, the degree of their readiness for action, and the time required to proceed with immediate execution of combat missions.

Revealing the nature and essence of combat readiness, USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov notes: "Our Armed Forces possess massive combat potential.... The capability of the army and navy swiftly and most fully to implement this potential in order to repulse potential aggression is reflected in their continuous high state of combat readiness, which is determined first and foremost by the quality of field, sea and air proficiency of personnel, the degree to which they have mastered weapons and combat equipment, the level of moral-political conditioning, discipline and organization of troops and naval forces, and skill in command and control of these forces."

Combat readiness is directly linked with combat potential, for we are dealing here precisely with the readiness of the latter for action, for execution of its functions. But this is a mutual linkage. Without development and strengthening of combat potential, for example, without an adequate quantity of modern weapons and equipment, even a high level of action readiness on the part of troops and naval forces will be unable to ensure an effective rebuff to an aggressor who possesses powerful nuclear and conventional weaponry. No less important is the inverse relationship: even the mightiest combat potential cannot be fully and effectively utilized without a high degree of combat readiness. History contains examples where troops possessing considerable combat power were defeated because of poor or inadequate combat readiness.

The main indicators of combat readiness are time (swiftness) and completeness of utilization of available capabilities. And intensification of the aggressiveness of imperialism and an increase in the genuine danger of war, the specific features of modern weapons and the character of war as a whole increase to an exceptional degree the significance primarily of the time factor.

The logic of development of military affairs is such that the time available for making ready for action specific weapon systems, subunits, units, combined units and the Armed Forces as a whole is increasingly diminishing. We must not forget that the aggressor always endeavors to attack with the element of surprise. While in the past, however, weeks and sometimes months were required to bring one's forces and weapons into a state of readiness to repulse an attack, in present-day conditions this period of time may be only hours or even minutes. This is why the question not only of a high degree of combat readiness but continuous combat readiness is so acute today, combat readiness guaranteeing, as stated in our Constitution, an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

As regards the second element of combat readiness -- completeness of utilization of all capabilities of the Armed Forces, it is essential to stress the following. If there are deficiencies, for example, in military manpower acquisition or in equipping troops, in the level of combat training of personnel or in forming and shaping their moral-political qualities, in the performance smoothness

of subunits or in the discipline of personnel, combat readiness as a whole suffers. It cannot be high if all its components have not been mobilized, if all the capabilities of equipment and personnel have not been taken into consideration and utilized.

In this connection it is not difficult to see that the elements of combat potential taken in their full scope and evaluated from the standpoint of development of their principal qualitative indicators, as well as taking the time factor into consideration, constitute the components of combat readiness.

A most important component of combat readiness is the degree of technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the quality of weapons and military equipment, their firepower, mobility, effective range, accuracy, etc. Hence improvement of weapons and equipment, determination of their latent possibilities, and development of automatic control systems has been and continues to be one of the leading directions to take in increasing combat readiness.

The capabilities of equipment, however, cannot be realized without human operators. Therefore the degree to which the Armed Forces are manned with personnel, the quality of their field, sea, and air proficiency, and their degree of mastery of weapons and equipment should be listed as the second component of combat readiness. Combat readiness is determined by military knowledge and skills, the degree of organization and discipline of personnel, and their ability to carry out their duties swiftly and with precision in any and all conditions. A substantial role in this is played by excellent moral-political and psychological qualities of personnel -- ideological conditioning, staunchness, tenacity, readiness and willingness to bear the burdens of war, and a frame of mind focused toward determined actions and victory. "The nature and features of a modern nuclear missile war," stressed MSU N. V. Ogarkov, "impose higher demands on the combat, moral-political and psychological training of army and navy personnel. The fundamental principle of this training has been and continues to be unchanged: learn that which is essential in war, learn to defeat a powerful, technically equipped adversary in any and all conditions of contemporary war."

As was noted, an important place in combat potential and consequently in combat readiness as well is occupied by perfection of the organizational structure of the army and navy -- its conformity with the equipment, personnel accomplishing combat missions, and the degree of development of the services, combat arms, combined units and units. Of determining significance here are such indicators as flexibility and mobility of organizational structure, precise interaction of its elements, combat smoothness of subunits, units, and combined units, and their ability to execute marches, swiftly to assume the required combat formation, and to execute aggressive offensive and defensive actions.

A special role among the elements of combat readiness is played by the degree of development of command and control and the quality of command and control cadres. The organizer abilities of commanders, staff officers and political agencies, their directing influence on the course of combat and political training, their ability to execute firm, continuous command and control in any and all combat situation conditions are the source and motive force for increasing troop combat readiness and successful accomplishment by troops of their combat missions.

Military science exerts an appreciable influence on the state of combat readiness. Supported by Marxist-Leninist methodology and directly addressing practical military affairs, it investigates all the elements of combat potential, all the components of combat readiness, the ways and means of military organizational development, and the modes of military operations. Military science equips officer cadres thereby with the fundamentals of advanced art of warfare and concrete operational-tactical recommendations.

The level of Armed Forces logistic support determines combat readiness. As we know, a large machine is sometimes inoperable due to the lack of a small screw. Entire units and combined units can lose their battleworthiness without prompt and timely replacement of requisite equipment and without adequate logistic support. It is for this reason so important to increase the operating efficiency of rear service agencies and to ensure full, prompt and timely provision of all requisite items to the Armed Forces. Combat readiness is expressed by quite specific indicators, which are different for each level of organizational structure of the Armed Forces. The scope and nature of tasks, powers, duties, and degree of responsibility of different categories of military personnel correspondingly differ.

A decisive role in maintaining and increasing combat readiness at all levels is played by officer cadres -- commanders, political workers, and military engineers. Achievement of the specified combat readiness indices for units, warships and combined units, and the Armed Forces as a whole depends on their ideological-political qualities, level of professional training, leadership skill and teaching ability. A major contribution toward accomplishing this task is made by warrant officers -- officers' closest assistants -- as well as sergeants and petty officers -- the most numerous command cadres.

Finally, achievement of high combat readiness indices for individual units of weapons, equipment, and crews depends directly on the proficiency and excellent moral-political and fighting qualities of the soldiers and sailors. Their discipline and conscientiousness in carrying out their military duty, their knowledge and skills in handling weapons and equipment, their endurance, swiftness of actions, and precision in carrying out their duties form the basis of accomplishment of all training and combat missions.

Combat readiness is an extremely important characteristic of the Armed Forces, but it does not represent a full evaluation of the Armed Forces. Combat potential, brought to a state of continuous, high combat readiness, in case of war should be manifested in actions in defense of socialist achievements, to repel an aggressor, and to defeat him totally and utterly. Actions in any area are evaluated on the basis of their result, their effectiveness.

It is a lofty goal of the art of warfare to achieve victory with the least expenditure of manpower and equipment, to defeat the adversary in detail, while preserving and strengthening the war-fighting capability of friendly troops and forces. A decisive role in achieving it is played by skilled actions by all personnel, innovativeness on the part of commanders, staffs, and political agencies, and superiority over the adversary in tactics and in skill in fighting engagements and battles.

* * *

Strengthening of the defense potential of the USSR, development of all elements of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, and increasing their combat readiness -- these are the principal stages which lead to a high effectiveness of actions in defense of the socialist homeland. The USSR Armed Forces, marching shoulder to shoulder with the brother armies of the socialist countries, stand in opposition to the aggressive plans of imperialism, serve as a strong bulwark of international peace, and are ready at all times to repel aggression from any quarter and reliably to defend the socialist achievements of peoples.

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ARMED FORCES

STAFF OFFICERS' HELP IN RAISING TRAINING LEVELS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 43-48

[Article, published under the heading "Party Affairs: Initiative, Firmness, Responsibility," by Col B. Malyudchenko, chief, headquarters and directorate political department, Red-Banner Odessa Military District: "Enriching With Knowledge and Experience"]

[Text] In a certain unit, the personnel of which had completed the past training year with high marks, I recently talked with officers about the sources of the unit's success. One of the subunit commanders said approximately the following: "We were greatly assisted by the comrades from the district headquarters and directorate, although we did not always look forward to their arrival, because we knew that inspection involves discovering deficiencies, and deficiencies involve criticism.... But we also knew something else. The headquarters and directorate officers, upon seeing deficiencies in our work, endeavored to help correct these deficiencies on the spot. Their advice, recommendations, and practical participation in the unit's affairs greatly promoted our success."

I had also previously heard similar statements. I believe that they give a graphic picture of the growing organizer role of district headquarters and directorate officers in organizing the training and indoctrination processes in the combined units and units.

The officers of the units and subunits have many nice things to say about Col Ye. Perfilov. They note his high degree of demandingness, his kindness, and his ability to delve deeply into the affairs of military collectives and to see the causes of deficiencies as well as unutilized reserve potential. They note his persistent endeavor always to correct deficiencies and his sincere interest in helping people improve things on the spot.

Colonel Perfilov is indeed one of the finest officers at district headquarters. This Communist is distinguished by initiative, right-mindedness, and a sense of responsibility for unwavering improvement in the combat readiness of units. It is well known that if Perfilov visits a unit for an inspection, there will definitely be changes for the better. He will not only check to see how combat training has been organized and how the requirements of guideline documents are being carried out, but he will also give people effective assistance. I shall cite a specific example.

Signal personnel were to take part in a tactical exercise. The higher-echelon commander had instructed Colonel Perfilov to check the readiness of men and equipment for the exercise. During the inspection the officer discovered in one of the subunits a number of deficiencies connected with readying equipment for field operations.

Colonel Perfilov also established the reason for this state of affairs. In the subunit they had arranged for the requisite work to be done on time, but problems had arisen. One of the specialists had taken sick, and somebody else had taken an emergency leave in connection with a situation in the family. There was a shortage of personnel, but there was a great deal of work to be done. Time was of the essence, and in their haste they sometimes forgot about the quality of operations.

Perfilov demanded that the deficiencies be corrected in preparing equipment for the exercise. Nor did he remain aloof from the subunit's activities. As they say, he rolled up his sleeves and helped the subunit's officers complete the job. The signal equipment was brought into exemplary condition.

Colonel Perfilov, however, was concerned not only by how the equipment had been readied. The political agency had instructed him, a headquarters Communist, to determine how effectively party-political work was being performed in the unit. How, for example, did the Communists perceive their place and role at the exercise? Perfilov knew that the party organization was headed by a young secretary, Sr Lt G. Burenkov, and he decided to see how the secretary had planned and scheduled his work during the time in the field and how skillfully activists had been placed in critical sectors.

It seems that Burenkov had taken onto his own shoulders practically everything the party organization had ordered accomplished. He explained his decision by stating that all the other Communists "have plenty to do without that," while he "would somehow manage alone." Of course Perfilov had to take a hand here. He gave Burenkov recommendations on how to distribute the efforts of party members and probationary members so that each would be responsible for a specific work sector, and he recommended how better to distribute his Komsomol activists.

Throughout the exercise Colonel Perfilov visited the most important sectors. Officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel constantly felt his demandingness and support. He gave practical assistance to the commanding officer in implementing the designated measures. Nor did he ignore the party organization secretary, giving him meaningful advice. When the situation permitted, he held talks with the men and focused them on high-quality accomplishment of assigned missions. As a result the signalmen received a mark of good, and they owed their success in large measure to their senior comrade.

A high degree of professional training, party concern for the assigned work area, a businesslike attitude and initiative -- this is what ensures fruitful activity on the part of headquarters and directorate officers and enhances their prestige. At the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, the USSR minister of defense described those qualities which are

most needed today by military leader personnel. These include competence, a heightened sense of the new, the ability to assume responsibility for performing complex tasks, to spot and support initiative in a prompt and timely manner, and to mobilize the will and energy of personnel. Today it is difficult even to picture a headquarters and directorate officer without these qualities. As we know, the range of his duties is broad. He frequently must visit the units, take part in organizing combat training, verify execution of training curricula and programs, orders and instructions, and give assistance locally. The headquarters and directorate officer is empowered to evaluate people's labor, to determine achieved results, and to report his opinions and suggestions to the higher-echelon commander. It is for this reason that demands on his personal level of preparation and work style are so high.

Experience convinces us that a poorly prepared, insufficiently competent individual is unable really to help people, to advise them how best to organize things. Upon arriving at a unit, as a rule he assumes the position of an impersonal recorder of facts. He seeks to amass as many as possible -- both positive and negative. The way he figures it is simple: his superior will require certain data for a report, for example -- here they are, right at hand, take your choice, for every situation. Sometimes certain officers are so successful in publicizing their zeal at gathering facts, that they appear to be effective workers in the eyes of their superiors.

Major K. (this officer is presently serving in another district) was instructed to check the state of weapon training in one of the units. He failed to address this assignment with an adequate sense of responsibility and did not look thoroughly into the organization and methods of weapon training activities. His entire work boiled down to collecting as many facts as possible. This officer looked like the stereotypical inspector general. He carefully noted down errors of omission. He made no attempt to work together with the inspected personnel to analyze deficiencies and to draw up optimal recommendations for correcting them. Nor did the officer see the positive elements present in organization of weapon training in the unit. I believe that there is little benefit derived from such a staff officer visit, if one may use this term.

Such instances are isolated, but they do cause one to engage in certain reflections. It is the duty of the headquarters and directorate officer to be a combat organizer, an aggressive indoctrinator, to use all one's activities in the units and subunits to promote improved quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process. He cannot perform the role of an outside observer, operating according to the principle of "I came, I saw, I reported, and that is the extent of my involvement." The leader-Communist has no such right. This is why even sporadic instances of a formalistic approach to performance of duties and an uninnovative, initiativeless attitude toward work in the units are thoroughly discussed in district headquarters and directorate party organizations. A keen, frank discussion impels each and every party member to approach evaluation of one's labor in a more demanding manner and more rigorously to evaluate the activities of one's colleagues. Issues connected with improving the organizational work of headquarters and directorate Communists in the units and subunits are regularly examined at party meetings and party bureau sessions, and measures are devised which are directed toward

developing in these personnel excellent moral-political and professional qualities as a decisive condition for increasing the effectiveness of the labor of headquarters personnel.

Party organizations constantly keep an eye on how CPSU members are deepening their military knowledge, increasing their operational and technical breadth, and mastering new combat equipment. Scientific-practical conferences and lectures are held for this purpose, reviews of military literature are organized, and the know-how of the best specialists is disseminated. By methods of party influence, party organizations seek to ensure that officers and general officers thoroughly understand the tasks proceeding from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the points and conclusions of the report presented by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the official meeting in the Kremlin dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, the demands of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the recommendations of the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. They endeavor to develop the initiative and activeness of headquarters and directorate party members and to reinforce all new and progressive elements manifested in their work style.

Instructive in this regard is the experience of the party organization headed by officer A. Gaysinskiy. Here party members do a great deal to assist commanders and staffs in organizing combat training, in improving its quality, in engaging in socialist competition under the slogan "Increase vigilance and reliably guarantee the security of the homeland!", in strengthening military discipline and unifying military collectives. Officer N. Golovchenko, M. Zadvoretzkiy, B. Golikov and others have proven to be genuinely aggressive organizers. They are helped in organizing their work efficiently by a high degree of professional training and the ability to assess phenomena and thoroughly to analyze facts from a party-minded position.

We would like to stress the following. Success in the activities of the party organization under discussion is also due to the fact that an atmosphere of exactingness and mutual demandingness reigns in this group. Party members regularly inform their comrades about execution of party assignments, improvement in their ideological-political level, work forms and methods in the units, and on participation in community affairs. In the course of presenting reports, stress is placed on unresolved issues, on the effectiveness and quality of the party member's work activities. Attention is also devoted to how comrades participate in party-political work on political agency instructions.

Precisely such an exacting, practical discussion at a party bureau meeting greatly influenced the professional development of CPSU member officer A. Onishchenko. At one time things were not going well for him, although at first glance it seemed that he had plenty of diligence and zeal. On one occasion this officer visited a unit and did not fully carry out his assignment. The party bureau members analyzed the reasons for the errors in the activities of this Communist officer. They talked with Onishchenko and his colleagues and determined that this young specialist did not possess firm knowledge of the

requirements of guideline documents. He also had little interest in military-technical literature. He believed that he would "get along" with the knowledge he already possessed. At first he indeed "got along." But tasks gradually became more complex, and it was necessary to display much more zeal and effort in improving one's personal professional level of preparation than in the past. Onishchenko continued to believe, however, that he understood everything and that there was no need at all to deepen his knowledge. This was a frivolous attitude toward performance of his professional and party duty. The activists made no bones about telling their comrade this at a party bureau meeting. They reminded him that the leader-Communist must approach primarily himself with a high demandingness, that his competence also predetermines his success at his job.

The party activists did not limit themselves to criticism. They also made sure that the best-prepared specialists helped Onishchenko rise up one step higher in his professional improvement and checked to see how this Communist carried out their recommendations. Gradually things improved with Onishchenko. He raised his proficiency rating, and people began to consider him a leading officer. It is not surprising that subsequently he was given a favorable recommendation for promotion and was sent for further schooling.

Unfortunately we have not yet achieved a situation where an atmosphere of genuine demandingness has been established in all party collectives. We still encounter facts which indicate that in some party organizations they do not go beyond talk about the need for each headquarters and directorate officer to have excellent professional training. Take, for example, the party organizations in which A. Litvinenko and A. Tret'yak are on the rolls. To hear the party members talk, they are concerned that certain comrades display inadequate competence during inspections. Critical comments were also made at report-election party meetings in these organizations, directed toward Communists who do not properly concern themselves with improving their professional level of competence. Judging by all indications, however, significant changes have not yet taken place. This of course cannot help but affect the state of affairs in those military units which the Communists of these party organizations visit in the course of their duties.

The political department of course seeks to correct and assist such party organizations.

For example, a report was presented by party organization secretary officer I. Gusev in the political department. Some party members here have conducted inspections in a superficial manner due to inadequate competence. A comrade once returned from a visit to a tank unit and reported that everything was fine with gunnery activities. Subsequently, however, a thorough inspection of the state of weapon training was conducted in the unit. They revealed flaws in organization of tank crew combat training. Thus the officer had been unable to delve deeply into the situation on the spot and failed to get a grasp of the situation. And of course he was unable to give practical assistance to people.

We advised the secretary to concern himself more with creating an atmosphere of exactingness in the group and to call strictly to account those comrades who have stopped advancing in their professional growth and who have an irresponsible attitude toward performance of their service duty. They also recommended holding a meeting on the agenda "Prestige of the Headquarters Communist." Political department officers helped prepare for the meeting. It was conducted on a good organizational level, with party members displaying a high degree of activeness. A meaningful, concrete decision was adopted. Time will tell if there will be results from the discussion. Members of the party organization have begun working more persistently on improving their level of professional preparation and have begun to be more demanding on those Communists who concern themselves little with expanding their ideological-political and military knowledge.

Meetings of party activists constitute a good school of instilling organizer qualities in headquarters and directorate Communists. Comprehensive group preparations for these meetings, relevance of items on the agenda, and persistent, purposeful work to implement adopted decisions -- all this helps boost the level of professional training of officers and, in the final analysis, helps improve the state of affairs locally.

Recently, for example, the question of strengthening party influence on growth of the ideological, political and professional training of headquarters and directorate Communists was discussed at a meeting of activists, as well as further improvement of the level of guiding the troops in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense. The commanding general of the district, Col Gen A. Yelagin, presented a report. As had been supposed, the discussion was frank and to the point. The recommendations contained in the resolution of the meeting of party activists are presently being implemented. And the first step toward this objective was meetings of the party bureau at which they discussed how better to implement the resolution of the meeting of party activists.

The political department seeks aggressively to publicize model examples of skilled work in the units. For example, the work experience of Col A. Kantsurov in the battalion under the command of Maj M. Zhitkevich was synthesized and disseminated. This officer displayed an example of demandingness, businesslike efficiency, and a model of excellent, intelligent staff management. What distinguished Kantsurov's activities in the battalion? Thorough knowledge of his job, a thoughtful approach to study of the state of combat training and military discipline, and attention toward others.

Having determined bottlenecks in planning and organizing combat training of battalion personnel, Kantsurov precisely pointed them out to the subunit's officers and offered recommendations on how best to organize things. The headquarters party member himself took active part in correcting deficiencies. In particular, he helped some young officers draw up individual professional training plans and helped organize methods classes with lower-echelon commanders on matters of disciplinary practices.

We focus party organizations on establishing everywhere a businesslike and innovative work style. We also direct attention toward the following important

element. While demanding and querying, the headquarters and directorate officer must appreciate the labor of those whom he happens to be examining or teaching. It sometimes happens, however, that certain headquarters personnel display elements of a disrespectful attitude toward unit and subunit officers. At a party meeting of one of the departments, I once heard comrades blaming "the lower echelon" for all the problems. We, they said, try hard and do things well and correctly, while "they" are irresponsible individuals. And they propose the same old recipe: punish, draw up scathing orders, to keep them in their place.... Obviously such "measures" have nothing in common with meaningful assistance to people on the spot.

I should also like to mention the following problem. Many headquarters and directorate Communists take active part in the campaign to strengthen military discipline and make a weighty contribution toward unifying military collectives. Officers and general officers, visiting line units, help commanders set up verification of execution of orders and directives, help them maintain strict observance of regulations and in analyzing disciplinary practices. I have seen time and again how officers U. Minikhanov, V. Lutsik, and others organize their work in one unit or another. Studying items designated for inspection in their assigned areas, they also address errors of omission in ideological-indoctrination work of unit and subunit party organizations. Frequently headquarters Communists present lectures and reports to enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers on topics of military discipline, military friendship and comradeship, and speak to officers on advanced personnel training and indoctrination practices.

But one also encounters facts of a different type. Some headquarters and directorate officers deliberately limit the range of their party duties. A comrade analyzes the state of troop service activities, for example. He studies all the documentation, glancing into every corner, as they say. But he does not talk with the enlisted personnel or NCOs, does not seek to determine their needs and moods. "Working with people is not my job," he explains. "I have my own duties, and I try to perform them conscientiously."

But can a headquarters and directorate Communist remain enclosed in the framework of his own area of specialization and stand aloof from others? After all, he is not only an organizer but also an indoctrinator of those with whom he is called upon to work.

Our own experience indicates that stable success in combat training of district military personnel, strengthening discipline and unifying military collectives depends in large measure on the amount of initiative and purposefulness with which headquarters and directorate officers work. The November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum pointed to the necessity of improving the organizational work of party organizations and all Communists. We are endeavoring to organize our activities in the new training year in the spirit of this demand.

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ARMED FORCES

TRAINING PROBLEMS IN VARIOUS UNITS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 60-65

[Article, published under the heading "Essays and Sociopolitical Commentary," by Lt Col V. Perov: "To Be or to Appear to Be?"]

[Text] How could there be any doubts? And the very question seems very meaningless. Of course there is only one answer: to be! To be that person you are in actual fact. And practical realities provide a good many confirmations.

...Gunnery performance testing was in progress. And the first inspection visits were gratifying: the firing was proceeding well. The tank crewmen celebrated victory a bit prematurely, however: one of the gunners failed to hit his targets. He failed to score a hit but, correcting his error, the gunner from the adjacent tank helped him out: quickly getting his bearings, he sent a shell and machinegun rounds precisely into the targets.

An unusual situation, to put it mildly. Both gunners were well aware of this fact. The targets had been hit, but not by the designated person. In actual combat this would have been called mutual assistance. But under the circumstances? We shall not be hasty with an answer, but shall think it over.

Because the battalion commander was absent, firing was directed by company commander Sr Lt S. Pivovarov. It was also his company which was performing the exercise. This officer now had the deciding word. He had to rate the performance of his own subunit. What would prevail: objectivity, the interests of the task at hand? Or, perhaps, concern that the mark to be assigned would determine the officer's next step up the career ladder, and ultimately his reputation? Pivovarov, without hesitation, reported to the inspecting officer the true story of the results of the run. One of the people around the officers' tower said: "What's the matter with you? You are bucking for battalion executive officer. This is where you should be showing yourself up in a good light."

"That is precisely what I have done," Pivovarov immediately replied. It did not seem that all of them immediately accepted the company commander's point of view. But when they did come around, after thinking the matter over, they approved of the commander's actions. And perhaps somebody for the first time

in his life came face to face with an unaccustomed question: to be or to appear to be? To receive undeserved praise and to seem better than you are in actual fact? Or to be satisfied with a mark based on one's actual performance, to act openly and honestly? Senior lieutenant Pivovarov had demonstrated by his actions that one must be, not appear to be. And he had taught a lesson of high awareness of duty.

Of course it can be stated quite simply: a most ordinary and commonplace deed. There are a great many examples such as the above. But this does not lessen its value, for behind such an action is a person's position, the principles according to which one lives. And it is extremely important what these principles are, for our daily activities fairly frequently put us to the test: "To be or to appear to be?" And at times it is very difficult to resist temptation....

There is nothing special about the fact that a person wants to earn a good name with those around him. It is even praiseworthy. It is naive to assume that somebody would not care what his party organization comrades thought about his job performance or how he looked in their eyes. A good name, a good reputation is a moral stimulus which activates a person's productive energy and compels one to work at full effort, to evaluate one's every step, every action with a high degree of demandingness. Concern about one's good name is also essentially concern about the good name of the entire collective, subunit, the achievement of common deserved success. But there also exist concerns of a different order. You see a person who seems to be trying hard, working hard, and frequently receiving praise. At an inspection, however, it seems that he is concerned only with making an impression, with passing off the desired as the actual. Figuratively speaking, we are dealing here with the distorted mirror effect, deceiving those around. There is also confirmation of this.

The rear services operation headed by Maj A. Prolenskiy was not distinguished by any particular brilliant achievements. But the officer had the ability to create the appearance of busy, intensive activity. Therefore there was formed the opinion of him as an enterprising individual, capable of solving any administrative problem and achieving things for the sake of the unit's needs. Prolenskiy even received commendations and was cited as an example for others for his "efficiency" and "competence." This flattered his ego. He wanted to "distinguish himself" to an even greater extent. But what about the obvious flaws in his job performance, which were in plain evidence? They would be concealed with enthusiastic reports about everything being "just fine." Prolenskiy made doing a camouflage job with busy activity his regular stock in trade. Soon alcohol also became standard procedure, consumed allegedly with "important people" in the interests of the common cause. Failures to appear at work were explained away as "seeking to obtain" short-supply materials from those same "important people." But finally, following an unseemly action, which could not be passed off as honest, many of his colleagues came to the conclusion: "He is not the person he tries to appear to be." The higher-echelon commanders, who previously had been impressed by Prolenskiy's ability to get things done, were disheartened: all that tireless activity had proven to be phony. Only then did the party organization speak up: they held this Communist sternly to account for personal lack of discipline and failures to perform his duty.

At the party commission meeting CPSU member Prolenskiy attempted to assume the pose of a misunderstood, unfairly accused individual with the very finest intentions, who had been insulted: "How could you do this? I wasn't working hard for my own benefit." Not for himself. But for whom? This individual wanted to look better than he was in actual fact. But at what cost? The fact is that another item must also be addressed here: how was it that with a little cosmetic gloss Prolenskiy sometimes succeeded in deceiving people?

Let us proceed from the opposite, as they say. Let us try to see things from Prolenskiy's point of view, stepping into his shoes, as it were, at that moment when he had just begun his assignment. A job which is, frankly speaking, a lot of work, requiring energy, efficiency, and management ability. And in addition, in one of the best regiments in the district. This imposed particular responsibility on the person. And he tried. Many things did not go just right, it is true. That had to be done, this had to be obtained. How? In what manner? You have to decide for yourself. And then the ideas come. It is not such a big deal if you don't do it, don't obtain it. At the worst they will think that you are not the best worker in the world. But who wants that? Prolenskiy did not. It is true that he was free to choose ways to resolve the problems which arose. And he, although not immediately, chose the path of dishonesty. This path simply proved to be the easiest one, and Prolenskiy's character was not strong enough to reject it. In addition, a significant role was played by the fact that a person would receive praise. If you "obtained it," "got it done" -- you are a fine fellow and are praised to the skies. If you present your operation to the inspecting officer in the best light -- you are a good worker. And he began to believe that he would be able to accomplish anything.

Well, somebody will say, according to the author's logic, Prolenskiy deserves indulgence. He became a victim of circumstances, which forced this officer to act contrary to party conscience. Prolenskiy deserves neither to be excused nor indulgence. First and foremost he himself, a Communist, bears responsibility for his deeds. But there is no doubt whatsoever that his senior comrades and the collective could have played a more important role in forming and shaping his moral and ethical qualities. And the party organization has considerable means to accomplish this. The problem, however, lies in how effectively they are utilized.

Questions pertaining to ethics and morality in a given formulation are examined at meetings, and party member reports are presented on their performance of party and job assignment duty, as well as discussions at party committees and party bureaus. A lack of principles, dishonesty, attempts to deceive, lack of modesty, and arrogance are justly condemned in these reports and discussions. But frequently something strange occurs: these just, firm condemnations suddenly lose their acuteness when they are dealing with a specific instance and a specific comrade.

Or, let us say, a speaker praises the less than modest successes of the group. His colleagues sitting in the audience are well aware of the true state of affairs. But they do not feel any embarrassment from the fact that the speaker, to put it mildly, is being less than objective. Their right-mindedness was clouded by "jingoism," for the speaker on the platform is talking about their

own group. And why be modest among friends? And perhaps these people sitting in the auditorium were just the day before having an impartial discussion with somebody about reevaluating achievements, while now they voice total agreement with the speaker without the slightest twinge of embarrassment.

What is the problem here? Why does this happen? It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer to these questions. For these questions, quite frankly, are not simple. One does not immediately discern the essence of a given action and the motives behind it. But if you do not do this, soon you will be accepting something as gold merely because it glitters.

Here is another situation which one sometimes encounters. People noticed somebody's diligent efforts and somebody's success. They gave encouragement. They mentioned his name at a meeting. This buoyed the officer's spirits. He endeavors to be worthy of the high praise of his group. He works hard and conscientiously. And he gains honor and esteem. Esteem is fine, but life moves on. It advances new tasks, and their accomplishment requires a different approach than before. And perhaps a person is not ready for this. Naturally he can be plagued by setbacks. And in addition, nobody is guaranteed against mistakes. And he makes mistakes, but is unable at present to overcome them by himself. He needs help, but he might consider it awkward to ask for help, since he is marching in the vanguard. They continue to mention him in reports, and they continue calling on others to emulate him. They do this by force of inertia. The officer feels uncomfortable under the burden of undeserved praise, but he cannot bring himself to say: "Wait a minute, let me catch my breath. I don't deserve this honor." This requires certain courage. And not everybody has enough courage. In addition, a saving thought is born: "It is not I who am doing the praising!" So he becomes accustomed to the praise.

The further you go, the deeper you get. It becomes quite difficult for a person to part company with the flattering status, even though imaginary, in which he finds himself. He has become accustomed to taking his place in presidiums and feeling the center of attention. And thus a false feeling of superiority over his colleagues gradually, imperceptibly gains the upper hand. It gains the upper hand because certain conditions have been created for this. Their names are lack of demandingness, lack of objectivity, and absence of exactingness.

Sometimes such facts are actually encountered. Once at headquarters of a certain regiment they insistently advised me to acquaint myself with the experience of a certain company commander. "We ourselves praise him a great deal. And we always recommend him for publicity in the press. He will tell you all about it," they told me as I left headquarters. They were correct. The company commander indeed laid it out for me. And how.

"Are you going to write about me or do you want my autograph?" And then he literally laid out on the table a fat file containing clippings from a large newspaper and the district newspaper, articles relating the achievements of the subunit, and he showed me the various certificates he had been awarded. "Why should you spend time unnecessarily?" the company commander said in an indulgent tone and, apparently sincerely sympathizing with the journalist's lot, "there is plenty of material here."

There certainly was. But it reflected yesterday's events. After acquainting myself with affairs in the company, today looked much paler. Discipline in the subunit had begun to "limp." They were trying not to notice "minor" violations. And those which they did notice and for which they meted out punishment were not reflected in the documents and reports, in order not to spoil the picture of well-being. The people in the company had been unable to reorganize the training process in connection with mastering new equipment. The commanding officer was aware of his errors, as was later determined from a conversation, and was plagued by pangs of conscience due to the duality of the situation in which he found himself. It took him half a year to escape from these vacillations. As we were returning from the tank training area, where his men had been satisfied with another mediocre result in IFV [Infantry Fighting Vehicle] operation, the officer, attempting to make his voice heard above the roar of the engine, summed things up, as it were: "I don't deserve praise. In the past -- yes. Perhaps in the future as well. But right now -- no."

In the future this officer, Capt V. Kulakov, indeed received praise, deserved praise. This officer's efforts were crowned with success, not without the assistance of the battalion party organization: the subunit once again became a competition leader. Having learned from the past lesson, Kulakov does not permit complacency in his new assignment, and gives his all to his job. He has deservedly earned a genuine reputation.

To remain true to oneself, to appear as one is in actual fact, means to be tested constantly, every day, for faithfulness to the feeling of party-mindedness and one's lofty duty. As we know, this striving is manifested in attitude toward one's job, in sincerity toward one's superiors and subordinates, in response to praise and criticism, in one's behavior when with others and when alone -- in all things which fill our lives. He who possesses worth and dignity will not forfeit it by creating pretense in his work, will not give up his party high-mindedness for the sake of the conditions of the moment, will not go to extremes of familiarity, endeavoring to obtain the cheap popularity of a hail-fellow-well-met, just as he will not give in to arrogance. A person with a feeling of his own worth and dignity is sickened both by lies and haughtiness. We should emphasize -- a person who possesses genuine worth and dignity, not an elevated self-importance. Unfortunately there still exists a false interpretation of certain human qualities, such as when rudeness is called firmness, when an endeavor to please is taken for respectfulness, and when an overbearing bass voice is considered a mandatory attribute of office.

We sometimes see how a charming, convivial person changes when he is promoted. He had been jovial, friendly, and sincere fellow. He would join the others in expressing his indignation upon encountering the arrogance of certain individuals. But now, strange as it seems, he appears to shy away from associating with persons of lower rank. He also has begun to display a condescending-patronizing way of speaking. He probably believes that this will gain him greater respect. Unfortunately he is deeply in error: natural behavior does not do detriment to authority, while haughtiness and arrogance merely undermine it.

But another problem lies in the fact that external attributes of alien, affected manners and actions can with time become a person's inner substance and position. The party organization has the capability and opportunity to prevent this. People see and know who has what worth and are able to identify insincerity in actions and manner. Unfortunately, however, it is sometimes considered not obligatory to create suitable public opinion. And sometimes people simply fail to notice undesirable changes taking place in a comrade.

A great many measures are conducted in units and subunits which are directly aimed at developing in personnel a feeling of worth and dignity, modesty, uprightness, and love of labor. Debates, specific-topic evening activities, and reader conferences. But in these activities one frequently employs only examples from literature, movies, the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. Today and the people of the given group remain beyond the framework of what is generally a useful and necessary discussion. Those whose selfless work and whose conduct are worthy of emulation. Those who are not working at full effort and who are willing to compromise with their conscience are also ignored.

To be or to appear to be? This is far from a personal question. It applies not simply to a specific individual, for a person who wishes to appear better than he is in actual fact seeks and expects a response from those around him. He has chosen them to be spectators in a play in which he has assigned the leading role to himself, thus satisfying his ambition. To combat such phenomena means to establish in the collective a healthy moral atmosphere, to be concerned in a party-minded manner for the success of the common cause which we serve.

V. I. Lenin wrote in one of his early writings: "...On the basis of what criteria are we to judge the **GENUINE** [in boldface] 'thoughts and feelings' of **REAL** [i.b.] people? Obviously there can be only one such attribute: the **ACTIONS** [i.b.] of these individuals, and since we are speaking only about public 'thoughts and feelings,' we should add: the **PUBLIC ACTIONS** [i.b.] of individuals...."

The public actions of individuals.... A person's true qualities are revealed most fully and vividly precisely in this, in work for the sake of the common cause. And in order to be master of the situation, it is essential to have high demandingness on oneself and to develop the ability objectively to assess one's strong and weak points, actions and deeds. Of course this is achieved at considerable effort and by daily work by mind and heart.

Nothing elevates a person so much as honest serving of others. And authority is not the lot of the elected few. Anybody who possesses a high degree of ideological and moral fiber can enjoy prestige and authority. And of course prestige and authority are not obtained by waving a magic wand. They must be earned; they grow together with a person. Just, for example, as the authority of officer I. Yefremov grew.

He, the new commanding officer, received a far from satisfactory legacy. The unit experienced a certain decline in its activity. Military discipline was not always at an adequate level, and insufficient thought was given to organization of the training process and matters of socialist competition. These errors of

omission were in large measure due to the sluggishness and low degree of demandingness toward others on the part of the previous commanding officer. And certain comrades accepted this state of affairs, turning in a mediocre job performance. Persistent and purposeful, Yefremov began with establishing a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective. His position was given complete understanding by the party organization. It began to concern itself more thoughtfully with instilling in Communists a striving toward productive growth and a mature, critical attitude toward achieved results. At the commander's initiative, party meetings and party bureau sessions began calling seriously to account those who were inclined toward complacency.

Some people had their own views of the commander's vigorous actions. Not everybody was happy with the severe measures taken against signs of arrogance and insincerity. But those who were "aggrieved" by the commander's demandingness ultimately realized that Yefremov was doing his utmost not for the sake of his own prestige. He could not be otherwise. He was guided in his work only by the good of the unit. He was strict and kindly, firm in decisions and decent, did not forgive the mistakes of others and did not hesitate to acknowledge his own mistakes. To wish good for another means actively to help him become better, to monitor in a party-minded and demanding way a person's professional, ideological, and spiritual growth and to suggest to him ways to correct his deficiencies. This is precisely what officer Yefremov was doing.

Of course self-assertion, in the final analysis one's own way of doing things, one's own work style, and gaining the trust of those around one are achieved gradually. They come when people feel their beneficial influence and, consequently, the influence of the person whom they characterize. That is what happened in this instance. The labors of the commander and the entire collective, in which the lofty principles of our ethics were established, were repaid a hundredfold. The subunit became a right-flanker in the unit. Officer Yefremov proceeded along this simple, the only correct road to recognition.

Yes, a person's endeavor to earn a good name, to gain prestige, and thus to gain acknowledgment is natural. This is a great moral reward. Having earned it, a person should always be concerned about his good name.

It is up to him to gain a good name, and it is up to him to preserve it. It is within the power, capability and interests of everyone to be, not to appear to be.

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ARMED FORCES

INDOCTRINATION LECTURE: FORMATION OF THE 'NEW MAN'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 66-72

[Article, published under the heading "For Political Instruction Group Leaders," by Col I. Semenov: "Formation of the New Man -- One of the Main Tasks in Building Communism"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The purpose of the class on this topic is to help enrolled personnel become deeply aware of the enormous importance of the task being accomplished by the party, that of indoctrinating the Soviet citizen as an active builder of a Communist society and a reliable defender of the homeland. Another aim of this class is to motivate army and navy personnel selflessly to carry out their military duty in conditions of an international situation which has become aggravated through the fault of imperialism, to have a conscientious attitude toward military labor, and to act at all times in conformity with the demands of the oath and regulations, as prescribed by Communist ethical and moral standards.

A total of 8 hours are allocated to study of this topic. It is expedient to divide this time as follows: 2 hours for a lecture (presentation), 2 hours for independent preparation, and 4 hours for a seminar (discussion).

It is recommended that the following principal topic items be covered IN THE LECTURE (PRESENTATION): 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens, army and navy personnel; 2. The Soviet Armed Forces -- school of indoctrination of youth. Persistently developing qualities of a conscientious and skillful defender of the homeland.

IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, the instructor should note that indoctrination of a new man is one of the most important program objectives of our party and an essential condition for building communism. A developed socialist society has been established in our country under the guidance of the CPSU. A new historical community of people -- the Soviet people -- has been formed. Carrying out the tasks of dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet State became a state of all the people. The leadership role of the Communist Party -- vanguard of the entire people -- has grown.

In the course of revolutionary building of a new society, thanks to the party's tireless indoctrinational activities and under the beneficial influence of socialist realities and the Soviet way of life, the Soviet citizen, the Soviet serviceman has grown, taken form, and become conditioned. Flesh and blood of their people, the Armed Forces embody the moral-political unity of our society, the friendship of peoples, the Soviet way of life, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Thanks to purposeful activities by military councils, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations pertaining to indoctrination of army and navy personnel, in recent years there has been further development of such traits of the defender of our homeland as moral fiber, conscientiousness, moral maturity, discipline, responsibility for the assigned task, mutual assistance and comradeship, faithfulness to revolutionary ideals and military duty, and professional skill.

In present-day conditions, when the aggressive forces of imperialism, headed by U.S. ruling circles, have declared a "crusade" against communism, military preparations have become sharply stepped up, and there has been a great increase in the importance of revolutionary vigilance on the part of Soviet Armed Forces personnel and the responsibility of each and every serviceman for carrying out his military duty to the homeland. It was stressed at a conference of Soviet Army and Navy leader personnel held at the Kremlin that today the time is such that the level of army and navy combat readiness should be even higher.... Of course party-political work in the area of indoctrination of personnel should be intensified. High morale has always been our army's most powerful weapon. This is true to an even greater extent today. It is the patriotic duty and moral obligation of each and every Soviet serviceman to be on guard, ready to rebuff any aggressor, to perform heroic deeds in the name of the homeland.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Communist Indoctrination of Soviet Citizens, Army and Navy Personnel

We are building communism -- the most just social system in history, about the creation of which the finest intellects of mankind dreamed over the course of centuries. Prior to the emergence of Marxism, however, this dream remained unrealizable. Marxism-Leninism alone pointed to mankind the way to freedom and happiness. This is a road of revolutionary transformation of society, which begins with establishment of political power by the worker class and leads to radical reorganization of all societal affairs, the economy, and culture.

One of the most important aspects of the radical transformation of society during the transition from capitalism to socialism, and subsequently its further development toward communism, is indoctrination of the new man. This is an inseparable, organic component part of the struggle for the victory of the new societal system, for the new system cannot be established without a profound change in the consciousness of people, their views, ways, customs, and habits.

Of course "alteration" of people's consciousness is a complex task, accomplishment of which requires certain time. It is necessary to overcome, to root out of daily practice habits, customs, and views which have taken deep root during the centuries of existence of the old system, which was invariably grounded on exploitation, oppression, and coercion. Many bourgeois ideologists considered

this task to be impossible to accomplish and predicted failure for socialism, since it allegedly would be unable to change the "nature" of man and the "eternal" instincts inherent in him: selfishness, greed, the desire for profit, and egotism.

But practical realities have refuted these fantasies. They have shown that there takes place in the course of building a new society a process, unprecedented in history, of man's moral renewal. Millions of people are being liberated from the power of old views, ways, and habits, engendered by centuries of a private-ownership economic system, and are developing within themselves a new system of thoughts and feelings, which corresponds to collective socialist production.

In conditions of socialism there occurs a change in people's attitude toward labor, toward public property, toward the collective, the feeling of love for the homeland, which has characterized them for centuries, is being filled with new content, and respect for people of other nationalities and ethnic groups is being instilled. Of course vestiges of capitalism are still in evidence in the first phase of communism, but they cannot overshadow the great, radical revolution in the consciousness of the masses which is being carried out by socialism.

V. I. Lenin stated that we cannot proceed to build socialism without enlisting in this process the great toiler masses which grew up and were indoctrinated in conditions of capitalism: "We can (and should) begin building socialism not from human material which exists only in fantasy and not from human material which we have specially created, but from that which we have inherited from capitalism. This is very 'difficult,' no question about it, but any other approach to the task is so frivolous that it is not worth discussing" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 41, page 33).

A determining role in changing people's consciousness is played by changing the conditions of their social existence. The practicalities of life teach people. Socialist societal relations, having been established in a country, promote the forming of new, collectivist traits, qualities and habits in citizens. Transformation of people's consciousness, however, is not an automatic or spontaneous process. Favorable objective conditions should be supplemented by subjective factors and by the influence of purposeful indoctrinational work by the Communist Party, the state, and public organizations. "Development of the consciousness of the masses," stated V. I. Lenin, "continues as always to be the foundation and principal content of all our work" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 13, page 376).

V. I. Lenin and the party always attached paramount importance to persistent indoctrination work among the masses and Communist indoctrination of people. Communist indoctrination signifies accomplishing multifaceted tasks: elaboration of a Communist ideological outlook, transformation of Communist moral and ethical standards into personal convictions and daily rules of conduct, comprehensive development of people's intellectual and physical abilities, and forming excellent aesthetic tastes and feelings in people.

The determining ideas of Communist indoctrination of the younger generation in the course of building a new society were formulated by V. I. Lenin in his famous speech at the Third Komsomol Congress in 1920. And although more than 60 years have passed since that time, each generation invariably turns to it in search for an answer to questions which are raised by new historical conditions.

Vladimir Il'ich assigned youth a triune task: to master knowledge which helps build communism; to affirm Communist morality; organically to coalesce knowledge and ideals with practical action, with participation in concrete productive labor together with workers and peasants.

Lenin's ideas were widely reflected in our party's documents and decisions. The CPSU Program points out that the party considers the main thing in ideological work to be indoctrination of all toilers in a spirit of high moral fiber, devotion to communism, a Communist attitude toward labor and the communal economy, total elimination of vestiges of bourgeois views and ways, comprehensive, harmonious development of the individual, and creation of genuine riches of spiritual culture. The party attaches particular importance to indoctrination of the younger generation.

The role of moral elements in the affairs of society is growing to an ever increasing degree in the process of transition to communism, and the domain of operation of the moral factor is broadening. For this reason the party considered it essential to formulate in its Program the moral code of the builder of communism. It would be appropriate for the propagandist to read aloud the provisions of the moral code and briefly to characterize the significance of each point.

As we move forward, in conditions of the extensive building of communism the importance of Communist indoctrination of the masses becomes increasingly greater. This is understandable: the scale of productive activity by the Soviet people is expanding; new generations of Soviet citizens keep entering the workforce, persons representing more than 100 different nationalities and ethnic groups; these young people lack life experience and have not experienced the severe ordeals which fell to the lot of the older generation; the ideological struggle against imperialism is becoming more acute, in the course of which our class adversaries are increasingly resorting to methods of psychological warfare and ideological sabotage. All this demands unabating attention by the party and state toward matters pertaining to indoctrination of the toiler masses, particularly the younger generation, in the spirit of Communist ideals.

It was noted in the Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress that success in indoctrination is secure only when it rests on the solid foundation of socioeconomic policy. Our state possesses great material and spiritual capabilities for increasingly fuller development of the individual, and these capabilities will continue to grow. But at the same time it is important that each individual be able to utilize them intelligently. And this in the final analysis depends on the interests and needs of the individual. This is why our party considers their active, purposeful forming and shaping to be one of the most important tasks of social policy.

The majority of Soviet citizens rightfully and intelligently make use of the diversified benefits offered them by society, preserve and build upon our public assets, and work honestly and put their heart into their work. But there are still people in this country who endeavor to give as little as possible and take as much as possible from the state. Selfishness and bourgeois philistinism, acquisitiveness, and indifference toward the concerns and affairs of the people appear precisely on the soil of such a psychology. Considerable detriment is done to society and the family by alcoholism, which continues to be a serious problem. The efforts of all workforces, all public organizations, and all Communists are directed toward the campaign against these ugly phenomena.

Indoctrination of the younger generation is a focal point of special concern by the party, state, and Komsomol, for young people who today are between the ages of 18 and 25 will tomorrow form the backbone of our society. It was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that fostering the formation of a generation of politically active, knowledgeable persons who love labor and know how to work, who are ready and willing at all times to defend their homeland is the most important, principal thing in the work done by Komsomol. And on the whole Komsomol is successfully accomplishing this task. It has hundreds of construction projects all over the country to its credit. Komsomol is also participating more in running the country and in all societal affairs. But there was also at the congress discussion of problems in indoctrinating young people. In some young people education and being well-informed sometimes exist side by side with political naiveness, while adequate occupational training and knowledgeability coexists with an insufficiently responsible attitude toward labor.

In this connection the congress pointed out the need to step up indoctrination work with the younger generation, meaning labor indoctrination, moral indoctrination, and ideological-political indoctrination. It was stressed that the point was not to increase the number of various "measures." The point is to create a lively, productive atmosphere in each and every Komsomol organization.

A businesslike, frank discussion on the need to improve Communist indoctrination of Soviet youth was conducted at the 19th Komsomol Congress. It was noted at the congress that we have good young people -- educated, talented, and intrepid. And that is how it should be. Youth is the morning of life. It is a time when a person takes form and shape as an individual, as a citizen. This is why young people should constantly study. And they should not only amass knowledge. They should learn honest labor and the ability to see life with all its complexities from the position of Soviet patriotism and Communist conviction. They should learn to be implacably against the slightest deviations from our societal standards. They should also go through the school of military service, learning a consummate mastery of modern weapons and combat equipment, in order to be prepared at all times to defend the homeland.

The Komsomol congress also discussed the importance of moral indoctrination of Soviet young people. It was stressed that people must learn from their early years to be well-mannered, highly organized, able to value their own time and that of others, respecting their elders -- in short, well-brought-up, nice, decent people, genuine citizens of a developed socialist society.

The party's concern with forming the new man, an ideologically convinced and active builder of communism, is expressed in a number of recently issued CPSU Central Committee decrees on this matter. A particularly prominent position among them is occupied by the decree issued on 26 April 1979, entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," called at the 26th CPSU Congress a document of lasting effect.

This party document points out that the building of a developed socialist society in the USSR, the enormous growth of this country's material and spiritual potential, and successes in the struggle by the CPSU and Soviet State for peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of peoples have created extensive possibilities for implementing our party's program objectives in the area of forming and shaping people's Communist consciousness. The Soviet Union's achievements in forming and shaping a new man, in development of science, culture, and public education are great and widely known throughout the world. We possess large numbers of well trained ideological cadres. A powerful information-propagandist edifice has been established in this country, equipped with modern hardware -- a widely developed press, television and radio.

This entire mighty information dissemination and indoctrination edifice influences many millions of people. Its principal task is to arm the Soviet people and each new generation with the invincible weapon of historical truth and a deep understanding of the laws governing and prospects of societal development, resting on the firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist teaching. The party directs attention thereby to the fact that in conditions of developed socialism the Leninist thesis that the state is strong through the awareness of the masses, that it is strong when the masses know everything, can reach a judgment about everything, and perform all actions consciously and with awareness is more relevant today than ever before.

The element of awareness is of particular significance in such an important area of state activity as defense of the homeland, of our revolutionary, socialist achievements. V. I. Lenin pointed to this. "The Red Army," he stated, "is strong because it marches into battle consciously and unanimously...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 38, page 234).

V. I. Lenin viewed political indoctrination of servicemen as a component part of educating fighters for the building of socialism and deeply revealed the specific features of formation of ideologically convinced, staunch defenders of the socialist homeland. The great leader pointed out that military hardware per se does not win battles. It becomes a formidable force only in the hands of people possessing a mastery of military knowledge, excellent moral-political and fighting qualities. Vladimir Il'ich stressed: "Victory in any war is determined in the final analysis by the spirit of those masses which shed their blood on the field of battle" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, page 121).

V. I. Lenin stated that conviction as to the just nature of the struggle and awareness of the need to sacrifice one's life for the benefit of one's brothers boosts soldiers' morale and compels them to withstand unprecedented burdens. The Leninist demand of ideological conditioning for Soviet servicemen has been adopted by the Communist Party, commanders, political workers, Soviet Armed Forces party and Komsomol organizations.

Following Lenin's instructions, the party teaches that even at the present stage in the development of military affairs victory on the battlefield is won by people, soldiers who are convinced of the justice of the cause for which they are fighting, who possess a skillful mastery of the potent combat equipment and weapons, who are conditioned both morally and physically. This is why a most important place in the overall combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is occupied by ideological maturity, political awareness, and moral-psychological conditioning of personnel.

These instructions are particularly relevant today. The party constantly addresses matters pertaining to political indoctrination work in the Soviet Armed Forces, concerns itself with its improvement and with training ideologically convinced and staunch defenders of the homeland. A vivid manifestation of such concern was the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, convened in May 1982 by decision of the CPSU Central Committee. Presenting a report at this conference, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov stressed: "Genuinely high-quality, stable resolution of the continuously more complex problems of combat readiness can be achieved only on the basis of a steady RISE IN THE LEVEL OF SERVICEMAN POLITICAL TRAINING AND AWARENESS."

Completing presentation of the material covered by the first topic item, the instructor should conclude that the vast majority of soldiers and sailors are deeply aware of the demands by the party and government on the Armed Forces and of their responsibility for carrying out their military duty to the homeland. They spare neither labor nor energy in order day by day to strengthen the combat readiness of subunits, units, and warships, and they are faithfully serving their people and the cause of communism.

2. The Soviet Armed Forces -- School of Indoctrination of Youth. Working Persistently to Develop Qualities of a Conscientious and Skilled Defender of the Homeland

Our army is rightly considered a school of indoctrination of Soviet youth, of teaching young people the most important moral values of our society. Young men lack life experience when they join the military family. But they return from the military as persons who have gone through a school of self-mastery and discipline, who have received technical and professional knowledge as well as political training.

The indoctrinational role of our army and service in the ranks of the military is due first and foremost to the historic role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Guarding the peaceful, productive labor of our people and defense of socialist achievements -- these noble aims determine not only the political but also the great moral significance of the activities of Soviet servicemen.

V. I. Lenin stressed that the socialist army radically differs from the armies of exploiter states. While a capitalist army is an instrument of reaction, oppression, "a destroyer of the people's freedom" within its own country, and an instrument of aggression and enslavement of the peoples of other countries, the army of the socialist state is an instrument of the people's power, and its principal function is defense of the revolutionary achievements of the toilers.

"And this army," stated Vladimir Il'ich, "is called upon to guard the achievements of the revolution, our people's rule, the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the entire new, truly democratic system against all enemies...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, page 216).

The leader of the revolution, giving a speech on Red Officer Day, repeated with satisfaction words he had heard deep within the people: "It is no longer necessary to fear a person with a gun." And he regarded these words as the finest reward for the Red Army.

For six and a half decades now the name of the Soviet serviceman has been linked in the consciousness of our people as well as the peoples of many other countries with the image of a person who is totally dedicated to his socialist homeland, to the cause of struggle against all kinds of exploitation and oppression, capable of noble, courageous deeds. In the eyes of millions of people the Soviet serviceman is an embodiment of honesty and truthfulness, vigilance and discipline, readiness and willingness to carry out military orders at any and all times, regardless of difficulties.

Any profession, any type of activity imposes certain responsibilities on a person. The demands on the serviceman are expressed in words which ring out sternly and at the same time loftily. He is obligated, as the military oath commands, to be an honest, brave, disciplined, vigilant fighting man, strictly to guard military and state secrets, to observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, and unquestioningly to carry out all military regulations and orders issued by commanders and superiors. When taking the oath, the serviceman swears to defend the homeland courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, willing to shed his blood and sacrifice his very life in order to achieve victory over our enemies.

Vital necessity and a call of the times are also contained within these words, for military service is connected with the most sacred thing in the life of each and every Soviet citizen -- the security of his socialist homeland. As is stated in our Constitution, defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of each and every citizen of the USSR, and military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honorable obligation of Soviet citizens.

In order to carry out one's military duty courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, it is necessary to be comprehensively prepared: ideologically mature, staunch, disciplined, possessing a total mastery of weapons and combat equipment, techniques of conduct of modern warfare, and to be faithful to the laws of military comradeship and soldier friendship.

People of course are not born soldiers. They become soldiers in the process of spiritual and physical maturation, a persistent striving to develop excellent moral and political and fighting qualities. This is fostered by the severe but uniquely beautiful military way of life with its daily routine figured down to the minute, with its reveilles and calls to assembly, its activities in the field, at the gunnery range -- and the extended cruise at sea for naval personnel, the solemn ceremony of trooping the unit's colors, the naval flag-raising ceremony, commencing alert duty, mounting of the guard, and many other

activities which have become an integral part of the daily life of the defenders of the homeland.

Young men serve in the army and navy at that age (18-20 years) when there is taking place most vigorously the process of development and consolidation of a person's principal character traits, and most important qualities. The general process of Communist indoctrination and formation of a comprehensively developed individual, which essentially has just begun in the family, in the school, and on the job, continues during this period.

A special place is occupied in the army and navy by the process of development of servicemen as ideologically convinced, conscientious defenders of the homeland. Political work at the front was correctly called the sharpest weapon: after all, it helped temper the hearts and souls of our fighting men, without which neither tanks, nor guns, nor airplanes would have brought us victory.

Soldiers and sailors acquire and improve political knowledge and ideological conditioning at political instruction classes. Political briefing sessions, TV program and film viewing sessions, and radio broadcast listening sessions are organized and scheduled for them, and newspapers and magazines are widely distributed. Suffice it to say that per-issue circulation of military newspapers and magazines runs 6.5 million copies. Our Voenizdat publishes more than 2,500 different titles in a total of 70 million copies. Each year more than 100 new feature films and as many as 250 documentaries and popular-science films are sent to military units. In recent years the number of television sets available to military personnel has tripled, while the total number of radios has increased tenfold. All this forms a solid material foundation for political indoctrination and intellectual development of military personnel.

Lenin readings and lessons, specific-topic evening activities, question-and-answer evenings, and "At a Map of the Homeland" evenings are held in military units; lectures and reports are presented, youth debates are held, as are get-togethers with war and labor veterans, leading production workers and people in science and culture. Excursions to enterprises and construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhoses are organized, personnel join amateur talent groups, performing ensembles, etc.

The process of ideological and spiritual indoctrination of servicemen is also promoted by the fact that literate young people are today coming into the army and navy, the great majority of whom have a secondary or secondary-technical education, with considerable cultural breadth. Reflected in this are the sociopolitical achievements of the society of developed socialism, attained under the guidance of the party, as well as the constantly rising ideological-political and cultural level of Soviet citizens.

The entire structure of military service and the entire system of personnel training and indoctrination are constructed in such a manner as to ensure the continuous combat readiness of subunits, units, and warships, precise coordination, field, sea, and air proficiency, and a high degree of combat expertise on the part of each and every serviceman. This is essential, for the international situation is extremely tense at the present time and is continuing to become

more complex. U.S. ruling circles have intensified their military preparations to an unprecedented level. They are openly rattling sabers and declaring the possibility of a "limited" nuclear war in Europe and delivery of a nuclear first strike on the USSR. For this reason each and every defender of the homeland bears particular responsibility today. Success in accomplishing the missions assigned to a military unit depends on how deeply each defender of the homeland is aware of the political significance of his military labor and how diligently he studies military affairs, observes the requirements of the military oath and military regulations, and maintains the prescribed order and discipline.

There is no exaggeration here. The role of personal awareness, preparedness and degree of training on the part of each and every soldier and sailor is greater today than ever before, for today's weapons as a rule are crew-served weapons. Crew members, squad and duty station personnel closely interact with one another in performing an assigned task. A mistake or delay by even one individual can lead to the most serious consequences.

The army forms an experienced serviceman and an expert in his military occupational specialty out of the young man conscripted into the military. A planned and orderly system of combat and political training classes and the smooth rhythm of the training process are focused toward this objective. This is promoted by the high degree of qualifications, combat skill and teaching know-how of the commanders who train personnel, as well as fine training facilities. It is demanded of the serviceman that he diligently work to master his military occupational specialty, persistently study his weapons and equipment, carefully commit to memory everything explained by his commander in training classes, adopt the know-how of outstanding performers in training and proficiency-rated specialists, and seek to join their ranks as rapidly as possible and to take active part in socialist competition.

It is important to realize that there is no and can be no upper limit to improvement of skills. He who, having achieved a certain performance level, becomes complacent and rests on his laurels, risks finding himself among lagging performers tomorrow and dragging back the entire unit. Therefore one must never rest on one's laurels but must value each and every minute of training time, seeking constantly to hone and perfect one's military skills. One should also remember the following. Having reached a certain performance level, pull your comrade up to that level. Help him if he has encountered difficulties in training, and share your amassed experience and knowledge. And he too will help you when he can. Such mutual assistance will have a positive effect on the affairs of the entire unit.

The military is a school of discipline, order, and organization. This is achieved by a high degree of demandingness on the part of command personnel, grounded on the provisions contained in field manuals and regulations, by maintaining in the unit and on board ship firm observance of regulations, by strict performance of the daily routine by all military personnel, and by purposeful political indoctrination work with personnel. Soviet military discipline is of a conscious character. It is grounded not on fear of punishment and coercion, as is the case in capitalist armies, but rather on awareness by each

serviceman of his military duty and his personal responsibility for defense of the homeland. The principal method of indoctrinating Soviet servicemen is persuasion and explanation of the provisions of the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, military regulations, and orders issued by the minister of defense. But persuasion does not exclude the possibility of coercive measures against those military personnel who conduct themselves in an unworthy manner and who violate discipline and our moral and ethical standards.

The world situation today demands of each and every serviceman extreme discipline, exceptional awareness and organization, and firm observance of regulations. Addressing a meeting of party activists of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District in December 1982, USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov noted the great importance of military discipline for increasing combat readiness. He stated that discipline and combat readiness are inseparable. The stronger discipline and the firmer observance of regulations in the subunit or unit become, the higher the level of combat readiness. This is why the degree of responsibility of servicemen for observing the demands of the oath and regulations and the Communist ethical and moral standards incorporated in them is so great.

The army is a school of collectivism, comradeship, a school of moral maturation for the young man. Regulations state that the serviceman shall value military comradeship, shall help his comrades by word and deed, shall keep them from committing unworthy actions, and shall rescue them from danger without regard for his own life. One can perform daily service, staunchly overcome difficulties and, in particular, perform successfully in modern combat only if one is confident that a reliable friend and loyal comrade stands alongside.

It is important that meaningful relations, grounded on the demands of regulations and our moral and ethical standards, be established in the subunit among all categories of military personnel, especially between experienced personnel and those inducted more recently. Firm friendship, prompt and timely support help young army and navy personnel rapidly become part of the unit and acquire the qualities of skilled defenders of the homeland.

Service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is a fine school of internationalist indoctrination. Today's military collective as a rule is a multiethnic collective, in which representatives of many of the nationalities and ethnic groups of our great homeland are serving. The task consists in making every effort to strengthen the bonds of this friendship, to help in a comradely manner those who presently possess an insufficient mastery of the Russian language, to draw a representative of each and every republic into the active affairs of the military collective, to help him reveal his abilities, his finest character traits, to become an outstanding training performer and a proficiency-rated specialist.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stated in an address at an official meeting at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR: "It is a continuing task of unfading significance to indoctrinate Soviet citizens in a spirit of mutual respect and friendship among all this country's nationalities and ethnic groups, love of one's great Soviet homeland, internationalism, and solidarity with the

working people of other countries. All party and Komsomol organizations, soviets and trade unions, and our Armed Forces, which have always been a fine school of internationalism, are called upon to accomplish this task."

Soviet servicemen are taking to heart this instruction by our party and its Central Committee. They comprise a unified combat family and are seeking by means of selfless labor to justify the trust of the party and people, to be in a state of continuous readiness to rebuff any aggressor. This is taught by army and navy service -- a fine school of life, a school of development of courageous, conscientious and skilled defenders of the homeland.

DURING THE HOURS OF INDEPENDENT STUDY, it is recommended that enrolled personnel study the following writings of V. I. Lenin: "On a Meaningful Basis" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, pp 408-409); "Tasks of the Unions of Youth" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, pp 298-318); the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (articles 31, 32, 59, 62-65); "Report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 57-58, 63-64, 66-67); the proceedings of the 19th Komsomol Congress (PRAVDA, 19 May 1982); address by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov entitled "60th Anniversary of the USSR," at an official meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR (PRAVDA, 22 December 1982); proceedings of the conference of leader personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy in the Kremlin (PRAVDA, 28 October 1982).

DURING THE SEMINAR CLASS (DISCUSSION) it is recommended that the following topic items be discussed: 1. How did V. I. Lenin formulate the principal tasks of Communist indoctrination of youth and of all Soviet citizens? 2. How did V. I. Lenin define the nature of discipline in the Red Army? What did he bequeath to Soviet servicemen? 3. In what is manifested the party's concern about the Soviet Armed Forces? What demands are placed by the CPSU and the Soviet State on personnel discipline and combat readiness of troops and naval forces? 5. Why are particular vigilance and unabating combat readiness needed at the present stage? 6. What is the role of friendship and comradeship in unifying the military collective? 7. What tasks face the subunit pertaining to increasing combat readiness and strengthening discipline and order?

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CSO: 1801/157

ARMED FORCES

SOVIET LAWS ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF STATE BORDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 78-80

[Article, published under the heading "Our Consultation," by Candidate of Legal Sciences Col Just Ye. Samoylov, honored jurist RSFSR: "USSR Laws on National Defense and Security of State Borders"]

[Text] Sirs: I understand that work is continuing on publication of Compiled USSR Statutes. I should like to learn in greater detail through your journal how matters pertaining to national defense will be reflected in it.

Maj N. Aleksa

In reply to the request by Comrade N. Aleksa, we are publishing the following consultation article by Honored Jurist RSFSR Candidate of Legal Sciences Col Just Ye. Samoylov.

Legislation on defense of the socialist homeland consists for the most part of all-union laws, containing provisions from various branches of law. Constituting an independent, combined area of legislation, regulating societal relations within the domain of national defense, the diversified activities of the Armed Forces, government agencies, establishments and organizations pertaining to strengthening the defense capability and security of the USSR, this legislation at the same time comprises an integral part of uniform Soviet laws.

Constitutional provisions pertaining to matters of national defense form the legal foundation of laws on defense of the homeland. Of importance in this connection is publication of a USSR Compiled Statutes as a collection of legislative enactments in force, revised and brought into conformity with the new Constitution and listed in order by subject.

A decision on the need to prepare a compilation of statutes was made at the 25th CPSU Congress, which also specified the principal aims of its publication: to help increase the stability of rule of law and to make legislation more available to Soviet citizens.

The compilation of statutes will be published during the 11th Five-Year Plan as an official publication of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. It will consist of seven sections, contained in 11 volumes.

The first volume has been published (the first section) -- Laws on the Societal and Governmental System -- and the ninth volume, which contains the sixth section of the Compiled Statutes -- Laws on National Defense and Security of State Borders.

Section 6 of the Compiled Statutes consists of six chapters: general aspects; military service; military ranks and insignia of military personnel; military banners and flags; benefits and services for military personnel, reservists and their families; other matters pertaining to national defense. It contains 30 legislative enactments and general USSR Government decrees pertaining to matters of national defense. The majority of these enactments have been substantially revised and codified and have been brought into conformity with the new Constitution and present requirements of military organizational development.

Considerable revisions have been made by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 December 1980 in the basic legislative enactment in the area of national defense -- the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation. This law has been substantially reworded. The changes and additions reflect provisions pertaining to defense of the homeland which are formally spelled out in the Constitution. The Law stresses the totally popular character of defense of the homeland, the role of the CPSU in direction of the Armed Forces, their duty to the people in ensuring this country's defense, the aims, tasks, and the necessity of being in a continuous state of combat readiness. The Law refines and details the procedure of enrolling young men in military educational institutions, as well as the procedure of granting induction deferments to persons enrolled at higher educational institutions. The Law specifies that military personnel discharged from active military service shall be given preferential treatment in enrolling in higher educational institutions, while those rehired at their previous place of employment are entitled to receive material assistance for initial settling-in. Workers, employees and kolkhoz farmers called up to military training activities or to participate in command-personnel training activities shall receive their average earnings in full. By Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 16 October 1980, general military regulations have been brought into conformity with the Constitution and other legislative enactments adopted on the basis of the Constitution.

In connection with preparation of the Compiled Statutes, numerous provisions have been codified pertaining to military personnel insignia, benefits and services for military personnel and their families, plus other items. For example, the Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 15 April 1981, on insignia of military personnel and marshal insignia combine 24 enactments on these items promulgated in the last 40 years. The USSR Council of Ministers decree of 17 February 1981, No 193, ratifies the Statute on Benefits and Services for Military Personnel, Reservists, Persons Retired From Military Service, and Their Families, which combines 35 legislative instruments previously in force, dealing with benefits and preferential treatment of military personnel pertaining to taxes, housing, health care, education, travel, labor and social insurance promulgated in the last 50 years. Consolidated instruments on military educational institutions, Suvorov military, Nakhimov naval, and military music schools have also been promulgated. An Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR

Supreme Soviet dated 25 September 1980 ratified a new statute on officers' comradely courts of honor, which specifies increased responsibility of commanders pertaining to supervising these courts, expanded jurisdiction of these courts, fuller provision for comprehensive examination of misdemeanors and other law violations by the courts, and a new procedure for electing the members of the court of honor was specified -- by a show-of-hands vote. The USSR Law on the State Border of the USSR was promulgated on 24 November 1982.

Promulgation of these instruments has resulted in filling in a number of gaps in the law, eliminating contradictions and obsolete provisions, as well as reducing the number of separate enactments on specific issues. All this has strengthened the integrity and coordination of laws in force. More than 100 enactments have been specified as no longer in force.

All enactments contained in Section 6 of the Compiled Statutes are arranged according to a specific system, providing sequential development of the section's subject matter and making it possible to specify fundamental enactments pertaining to defense of the homeland, which facilitates using and applying the law.

The USSR Armed Forces constitute a dynamic organism of the state, in which there is taking place continuous development of concrete military relationships which require legal regulation. And this will entail further improvement of the materials of the Compiled Statutes, the addition of new enactments, and the replacement of certain enactments by others -- revised and codified. Volume 9, just as the other volumes of the Compiled Statutes, is published in looseleaf-type binders, which will make it possible to update materials without republishing entire volumes, by replacing outdated enactments with new ones.

Since laws on defense of the homeland comprise a combined area, provisions regulating relations in the area of national defense are also contained in a number of enactments in other sections of the Compiled Statutes. Constitutional provisions on defense of the homeland are concretized, in particular, in the Laws on the USSR Council of Ministers, on public oversight, on elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in legislative enactments on the soviets. Corresponding provisions are also contained in enactments on institution of decorations and medals to be awarded for services in the area of defense of the homeland and other meritorious military services. All these enactments are contained in Section 1 of the Compiled Statutes -- Legislation on the Societal and Governmental System.

A number of military legal enactments, which are a component part of legislation on defense of the homeland, are included in Section 7 of the Compiled Statutes -- Legislation on Justice, Prosecutor's Office Legality Oversight, and Maintenance of Rule of Law. These enactments include the Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes, the Statute on Military Tribunals, and the Statute on the Judge Advocate General's Office. Enactments pertaining to military law are also contained in the Fundamentals of Criminal Law and the Fundamentals of Legislation on Administrative Law Violations, in the Law on Criminal Liability for Crimes Against the State, as well as certain other enactments contained in this section of the Compiled Statutes.

Volume 9 and the other volumes of the Compiled Statutes, as they are published, will go to the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the main headquarters of the branches of service, the headquarters of districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies and flotillas, to kray, oblast, and republic military commissariats, and to military higher educational institutions.

Upon publication of Section 6 of the Compiled Statutes, it is important to step up efforts in the area of explaining legislation, utilizing toward this end commander training, political instruction, dissemination of legal information, and other forms of training of officers and all personnel.

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CSO: 1801/157

GROUND FORCES

RAISING QUALITY OF TACTICAL FIRE TRAINING IN TANK REGIMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 28-32

[Article, published under the heading "Questions of Training and Military Indoctrination," by Maj Yu. Klynkin, regimental commander: "In the Struggle for Excellent Quality of Tactical and Weapon Training"]

[Text] Winter combat training is in full swing. Responding with deeds to the decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the personnel of our regiment are working hard to carry out the demands of the party and USSR minister of defense pertaining to troop combat readiness, training curricula and socialist pledges. Strengthening efficiency, organization and responsibility for the assigned task throughout the entire training process, commanders and political workers are devoting particular attention to further improving the quality of field performance, and particularly its core -- tank crew tactical and weapon training. The regiment party committee and party organization are giving them appreciable daily assistance in these efforts. They have amassed what in my opinion is some interesting work experience connected with ensuring personal exemplariness by party members in combat training, improvement of their military work style, and development of their organizing abilities.

I shall relate an incident which characterizes to a certain degree the party organization's ability to influence the state of affairs in a given area and the businesslike atmosphere in the party collective.

At a fire training drill poor results were achieved by the tank company under the command of Capt V. Gomel'ko. An analysis of the poor firing performance, conducted on the spot by regimental staff officers present at the drill, revealed a number of serious deficiencies, particularly in the methods employed by the company commander to work on training topic items and in organization of socialist competition.

Captain Gomel'ko felt to blame, that they were his errors and that he was responsible for them. He was expecting censure. But we decided not to be hasty with our conclusions but to talk with the company commander at a meeting of the party committee, and later to analyze the unsuccessful drill at a conference of officers.

We should note that party member Gomel'ko spoke self-critically about himself at the meeting of the party committee: he had given inadequate attention to this point, had failed in that point, and had not seen the main element in another point. And he was quite straightforward, without reference to "objective" factors. In short, we were convinced that the company commander was high-minded and hardworking. But he lacks experience. For example, they began combining fire training with tactics in the unit. Gomel'ko failed to attach adequate significance to this important matter which, incidentally, requires both additional effort and time. He was of the opinion that during that period improving the skill of the drivers demanded particular attention in his subunit. Now, however, a new problem appeared -- deficiencies in tank crew weapon proficiency.

What was the decision of the party committee members? Having suggested to the party member how to correct the state of affairs, we at the same time assigned ourselves the task of assisting the young company commander to improve his methods skills, especially in organizing tank gunnery drills and meeting gunnery performance standards. We assigned this task specifically to one of the unit's best gunnery methods specialists, party committee member Maj N. Zelenov. He began paying frequent visits to the company and attending training activities, and he has given a lot of help to the commanding officer and to the party organization secretary and members.

Take the following fact, for example. Major Zelenov, examining the state of affairs, established that almost all Communist officers in the company have low proficiency ratings. This naturally has an adverse effect on their gunnery skills and prevents them from acting as a good example to their subordinates. At a party meeting held in the company, Zelenov drew the attention of the commanding officer and party members to this fact, and reminded them that their demandingness on the men should begin with increased demandingness on themselves.

We could also cite other examples where the company commander and party organization members have utilized in their work recommendations given by Maj N. Zelenov and other party committee members and have relied on their assistance. But in my opinion the point is not enumeration. What is important is the result of joint efforts: in this subunit emphasis has been placed on improving the quality of tactical and gunnery training for officers and all personnel. The commanding officer and the party organization have improved indoctrination work with personnel. And the tank crewmen's level of skill has improved with time. Attention on the part of party activists helped the young company commander objectively see in his work both strong and weak points, focused him toward thoughtful reflection, and instilled in him faith in his own abilities. And when deficiencies in the gunnery training of the company's tank crews was discussed at the officers' conference, the exacting analysis did not seem excessively severe to Captain Gomel'ko. Morally prepared for it and already having seen in part ways to correct deficiencies, he correctly perceived the comments and instructions.

Changes for the better which have taken place in the company confirmed that the kindly tone taken by the officers from headquarters and party committee members

in analyzing Capt V. Gomel'ko's errors of omission had a favorable effect. We employ the same approach in working with other officers in whom shortcomings are revealed in personnel combat training. Solving problems in a coordinated manner, we take into account officers' individual qualities and professional training. In working with each individual we seek the proper approach, endeavoring to merge the efforts of commander and staff on the one hand and the party organization on the other.

In his speech at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov stressed: "A correct combination of one-man command with reliance on party organizations and active utilization of the productive resources of the army and navy community is a most important condition for successful accomplishment of the missions assigned to the troops and naval forces."

Carrying out the conference recommendations, the regimental party committee is constantly concerned with ensuring that the party organizations of the subunits make every effort to support the commanders, strengthen their authority, with the latter in turn directing the efforts of Communists toward accomplishing the principal tasks of combat readiness and heeding their opinion. I shall cite the following typical example.

At a meeting of the party committee it was decided to present a report by battalion commander CPSU member Maj I. Zinich on how he relies on the assistance of the party organization in the campaign to improve the level of tank crew tactical and gunnery proficiency. I must frankly admit that at the time I wondered whether this was necessary, for it seemed that everything was going well in the unit. Party committee secretary Lt Col G. Gudmanyen spelled it out: consistently decent tactical and gunnery training results had engendered complacency on the part of some people in the battalion. Even certain party-member officers were content with the status of "average performers." Also partly to blame is the commanding officer, in general an experienced officer-indoctrinator, as well as the battalion party organization. It would be useful to examine the prevailing atmosphere, promptly to draw the attention of party members to deficiencies in work style, and to give help if necessary.

I listened to these arguments. But I suggested that we begin by attending a party meeting in the battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Gudmanyen and I attended the meeting. Here is what we saw. Party members P. Smetanyuk and N. Afanasenko, who spoke following presentation of the report, acutely addressed the question of inadequate exemplariness in the combat training and service performance of certain comrades. This applied particularly to party members Sr Lts S. Bukin and G. Zhukovskiy, who had recently done little to improve their level of professional training and had not been employing advanced methods of training and indoctrinating subordinate personnel. Errors of omission had also been revealed on the part of these officers in methods used in tactical and gunnery training drills and in organization of individual indoctrination work.

These facts naturally were a matter of concern to us. But the fact that the battalion Communists told these comrades the truth face to face, without smoothing off sharp corners, was gratifying. Since the party members were not afraid to state openly that the negligent attitude of Bukin and Zhukovskiy toward performance of their duties was a consequence of diminished demandingness toward them on the part of the commanding officer, the battalion political worker, and the party bureau, this means that the moral climate in the party organization is healthy. And with its assistance complacency in the military collective can also be overcome.

A party committee meeting was held several days after the party meeting. Thus presentation of Maj I. Zinich's report was a logical continuation of the initiated discussion. It was pointed out to the battalion commander and the party organization secretary that they were doing a poor job of guiding the efforts of party members toward improving the quality of tank crew tactical and gunnery training and had resigned themselves to facts of an unconscientious attitude toward training on the part of certain individuals. The party committee instructed subunit leader party members to respond with deeds to the critical comments.

The battalion commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the party bureau members were forced to reexamine many elements in their work following the meeting and the party committee session. Carrying out the recommendations of the regiment party committee, they began devoting greater attention to work with individual officers and to quality of commander training classes. The party bureau increased demandingness on Communists, seeking to ensure their personal exemplariness in training. The battalion commander and the members of the party bureau began calling more strictly to account those who failed to display adequate zeal in mastering equipment and weapons and improving their professional skills. Party and Komsomol activists synthesized and disseminated the experience and know-how of the best platoon and company leaders in organizing tactical and gunnery training and in socialist competition.

The men of this subunit can no longer be called "mediocre performers." Unutilized potential can be seen increasingly more clearly today on the background of obvious achievements. The commander, political worker, and all party members, uniting efforts in the campaign to achieve a high level of tactical and gunnery training, are finding and utilizing reserve potential for growth.

The members of the party committee also drew conclusions for themselves. They view the critical remarks and suggestions stated at party meetings, service conferences, and during talks between leader-Communists and personnel as an important, but not the sole source of information and determination of the local state of affairs. Instances of indifference in Maj I. Zinich's battalion could probably have been avoided if the officers from regimental headquarters and the party committee members had looked more deeply into the practical organizational and indoctrination activities of subunit commanders and party organizations and into the moral atmosphere in the military collectives.

Party committee members G. Gudmanyanyan, A. Nesterenko, A. Zhiroukhov and others working in the subunits as a rule seek to determine how firm is the contact

between the commanding officer and the party organization. Do party members support demanding commanders? Do the one-man commanders always direct the party members' knowledge and experience toward unifying military collectives and creating a healthy moral climate in them? How do they utilize the great strength of the party organization to achieve the goals assigned to the subunits, and how do they rely on them in their work? These questions are constantly at the center of attention of the party committee. And as a result -- the regiment party organization is exerting increasing influence on the training and indoctrination process.

This influence is particularly appreciable, for example, in increasing the effectiveness of socialist competition. The battalions under the command of party member officers Yu. Omel'chenko and A. Kutyavin have specified for themselves ambitious performance targets in improving tactical and gunnery training. In analyzing pledge performance results, the members of the party committee drew attention to the following. Lieutenant Colonel Kutyavin's battalion quite frequently was a competition winner. The tank crews would distinguish themselves in achieving gunnery performance standards, and they would receive a high mark at a tactical exercise. But the lack of stability of results was cause for concern. At one tank gunnery drill, for example, personnel barely achieved an overall mark of good. When officers from regimental headquarters inspected the weapons and combat equipment, they discovered that all was not well in the battalion in this important area.

The situation is different in Lt Col Yu. Omel'chenko's subunit. They achieve consistent success in combat training. And the movement is upward: results improve from one month to the next. And this is particularly noticeable in improving the gunnery skills of personnel and their tactical proficiency.

The state of affairs in these battalions and the performance results of these collectives in tactical and gunnery training were discussed at an officers' conference and at a party committee meeting. The activists thought about it and analyzed the results of the most recent months of combat training. After this the battalion commander, Lt Col A. Kutyavin, the political worker, and the party organization began to be more exacting in evaluating the men's training results and began doing a better job of focusing them toward daily conscientious labor. Every field exercise and every training drill was monitored by officers from regimental headquarters, with unremitting attention paid by party committee members. Members of the unit methods council assisted the young platoon and company commanders in organizing competition at tactical and gunnery training drills.

What has been achieved to date? I cannot say that the situation in the battalion has been fully corrected. But the inconsistency in combat training performance results has now been eliminated. And I believe that primary credit for this must go to all Communists of the headquarters party organization and members of the party committee who shared my concern and became actively involved in corrective efforts.

Analysis of competition in the two battalions and work subsequently performed gave us important food for thought and material on which to base our actions. The

party committee members helped party members Yu. Omel'chenko and A. Kutyavin step up competition between officers to raise their level of professional knowledge, proficiency rating, tactical and gunnery skills. Platoon and company commanders give the men an example in the campaign to achieve new performance levels in military-technical training. Both battalion commanders, their deputies for political affairs, and party activists of the competing subunits constantly compare and publicize results achieved by the officers, thus motivating lagging personnel to attain the level of the leaders.

In our unit there are many instances of such merging of efforts between command authorities and the party organization. These show the lack of complacency on the part of party members and their endeavor continuously to influence personnel and, through them, the state of affairs, and to assist wherever problems arise and difficulties are encountered. Members of the party committee and headquarters Communists always respond keenly and in a businesslike manner to deficiencies. They combine frankness and firmness with attention toward personnel and objectivity with the ability to penetrate deeply into the heart of the matter and to give a party assessment. All new and valuable elements in the work performed by commanders, political workers, and party activists are promptly synthesized and disseminated in other subunits.

Matters connected with improving the quality of tactical and gunnery training are periodically raised at party and Komsomol meetings and are particularly emphasized when totaling up competition results at meetings of officers and other military personnel. Those who fail to display proper effort in their training and who are guilty of unnecessary relaxation of demands and unnecessary situation simplification are brought strictly to account.

The party committee and party bureaus of the party organizations of regimental headquarters and the battalions regularly receive reports from Communists about their personal exemplariness in training and discipline, in carrying out socialist pledges, and have appreciably improved verification of execution of resolutions adopted at party meetings. Many subunit commanders, skillfully relying on the assistance of party members, mobilize the men for achieving excellent performance levels in tactical and gunnery skills. This can be stated in particular about the commanders of our best tank companies, Capts M. Zavarzin and N. Knysh.

The regiment's officers know from their own experience that the closer their contact with the party organization and the better coordinated is administrative and party influence on people, the more successfully is accomplished the complex task of improving personnel tactical and gunnery training.

Of course we have both bottlenecks and as yet unresolved problems, unutilized reserve potential and possibilities in this important area. Many of these were revealed during discussion of the tasks of Communists proceeding from the decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. But amassed and practically verified experience enables us to hope that through the joint efforts of the regimental command authorities and party organization, intensive and fruitful training will be ensured, as well as a responsible attitude on the part of each and every serviceman toward improving his military skills. And this means that the tactical and gunnery proficiency of tank crewmen will also increase.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION: DRIVER TRAINING IMPROVEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 33-36

[Article, published under the heading "Questions of Training and Military Indoctrination," by Capt A. Kravchenko, commander of an excellent-rated motorized rifle battalion: "The More Cohesive the Group, the Greater the Success"]

[Text] The situation at the vehicle driving exercise was difficult. Wet snow, which had just stopped falling, had turned the route into a slippery mess, and this required considerable skill on the part of the armored personnel carrier drivers. Komsomol member Pvt Yu. Maystrikov was one of the first to perform the exercise. He is an experienced driver and is rightly considered one of the best specialists in the subunit. The fact is that platoon commander Lt A. Savel'chikov was not worried when he sent this man out on the route, as he was confident that the soldier would receive a high mark. Nor did Private Maystrikov doubt his ability. He negotiated the most difficult stretches very skillfully, surpassing the time standards. The chief instructor congratulated him on his excellent mark.

The mood of Pvt A. Moiseyev, Maystrikov's comrade in socialist competition, was different. He was constantly nagged by doubts about one of the obstacles on the route, which took away his confidence: "I won't be able to enter the 'emplacement' along such slippery ground; I'll smash the wall...."

Maystrikov, who had completed his run, immediately noticed his comrade's nervousness and went over to him. And soon both soldiers, using a matchbox as an APC, were "negotiating" an improvised vehicle shelter.

"The main thing is to bank the vehicle correctly on entry," Moiseyev was advised by Maystrikov, still flushed from his recent run. "But it is also possible to slide into an 'emplacement' down a slippery ramp. You must apply the brakes carefully. Otherwise you'll skid...."

Privates Maystrikov and Moiseyev were inducted at the same time. They are at approximately the same level of experience and skill. And yet at previous exercises as well Maystrikov's actions had been more confident in similar situations, when the route was sodden and one had to adapt to it. He also felt obliged to help his competition rival. This did not insult Moiseyev or

injure his self-esteem. It also sometimes happens that he would help his comrade. For example, in such an important matter for APC drivers as the ability to enable gunners to deliver aimed fire from a combat vehicle while rolling.

Pvt A. Moiseyev also received a mark of excellent. He returned from the run excited and satisfied with himself. But if there were an instrument capable of measuring the emotional state of soldiers, it would still be impossible to determine whose joy was greater from the successful run -- that of Moiseyev or Maystrikov, who had been more concerned for his friend than for himself.

What does this incident from the combat training of motorized infantrymen tell us? First of all, the fact that the moral aspect is determining in the competition between Pvs Yu. Maystrikov and A. Moiseyev, with the main thing not victory for the sake of victory but rather attention toward one's rival, personal involvement in his successes and failures, and the desire to help, to compete with one's good comrade and friend who is equal or stronger in knowledge and skill.

Second, this incident reflects as in a mirror the comradely mutual assistance between soldiers of identical military occupational specialties, between squads, platoons, and companies, which has become a regular occurrence. Nor can servicemen compete other than on a moral and ethical foundation. A common goal -- the struggle for the coveted title of excellent battalion -- unified the men and brought all the efforts of commanders, the party and Komsomol organizations, and the battalion collective as a whole to a common denominator whereby the failure of one's rivals becomes a common failure, while joint efforts to correct deficiencies becomes a matter of honor for the competing collectives.

It is always easy to talk about what has already been achieved and is the end result of a great deal of indoctrination effort. What I have in mind is the friendship, cohesiveness, and genuine collectivism of the men of our battalion. They have been joined into a unified fighting family by the lofty duty of the defender of the homeland and responsibility for the subunit's combat readiness. Another element here was the fact that implementation of the demand stated by USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov -- to ensure that the men comprise not simply a specific arithmetic sum of military personnel, but a genuinely united, harmonious, cohesive family, with the ardent desire to carry out their duty to the homeland in a worthy manner -- gave a great degree of purposefulness to the work being done by the battalion's officers, party and Komsomol organizations.

We rightly consider friendship and military comradeship to be one of the main factors which promoted achievement of the objectives specified in the competition and the fact that the battalion is rated excellent. And we would like to give some thought to the following question: how were these valuable qualities developed and how are they developed in personnel? How is a moral foundation placed under them?

When I was a young officer candidate, our commanding officer liked to repeat: "You are future officers, and the success of the job which you will be assigned to do depends in large measure on you yourselves, on your personal exemplariness...." This generally simple truth is the foundation of

indoctrination work in our battalion. Commanders and political workers, as well as all party member-officers, realize that the friendship and solidarity between them is a guarantee of healthy, proper relations between enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, and is the correct path toward strengthening their collectivism.

I shall cite an example which reveals the indoctrinational role of competition. The companies under the command of party members Sr Lt A. Glushchenko and V. Bratus' have been competing with one another for several years now. I shall state at the outset that both subunits are excellent. And this is fostered to a considerable degree both by the healthy spirit of competition in the struggle to emerge victorious and by comradely mutual assistance. The company commanders are fine colleagues and friends in general. The same can be said about the personnel of both subunits. Enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers turn to one another for help, spend off-duty hours together, and have no secrets from one another.

Also instructive in this regard was the situation which developed at a tactical exercise being performed by the company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bratus'. On the eve of the exercise I was approached by Senior Lieutenant Glushchenko, who requested permission to observe the exercise and take part in the critique.

I gave permission, and the company's platoon leaders also were present at the exercise. This was not a desire to "check out" their socialist competition rivals, to determine their strengths and weaknesses. Both Glushchenko and the other officers learned from the experience of the rival company, and they in turn offered advice and assistance. I asked them to present their opinion at the post-exercise critique. Senior Lieutenant Glushchenko, approaching the subject objectively and innovatively, explained to Senior Lieutenant Bratus' the reasons for a certain slowing of the pace of advance and analyzed errors of omission when the company was deploying into combat formation.

And this is not an isolated incident, but an established system. Exchanging experience and know-how and analyzing each other's actions following each exercise and scheduled drill, the companies' officers, enlisted personnel and NCOs were producing increasingly higher performance day by day.

We should note that joint quests and discoveries, and success in the struggle against difficulties were also involving other subunits in the battalion. Regular issues of radio newspapers and news bulletins, for example, were devoted to progress in competition between the collectives. The battalion party organization, concerned about the indoctrinational role of and moral gain from competition, took upon itself the initiative of synthesizing the work experience of party members Glushchenko and Bratus' as well as other officers of the competing companies.

We must stress that deputy commander for political affairs Capt Yu. Skal'skiy, party and Komsomol activists -- all of us attach great importance to indoctrination work with individuals. We see it as one of the main and indispensable conditions for unifying the collective and achieving the designated performance levels.

A great many examples can be cited in this regard. Here is one. Squad leader Sgt N. Strashkevich is a skilled methods specialist and experienced marksman. It would seem that this military collective possesses all the prerequisites and capabilities to perform successfully. But it was not. Personnel would violate military discipline, fail to display adequate cohesiveness, and friendship in the squad left much to be desired.

Having directed attention to deficiencies and asking myself: "Why is this happening?" I decided not to draw hasty conclusions, made a close examination, analyzed, and spoke at length with the company commander. And I realized what the problem was. Quite briefly, during the course of many months of combat training neither the squad leader, Sergeant Strashkevich, nor his men were given any encouragement by their immediate superior or by the other officers. I saw this as a serious deficiency, an appreciable flaw in work with individuals, for moral incentive to personnel is an effective form of indoctrination, which must be extensively utilized in socialist competition. It enhances the prestige of the top performers, motivates others to emulate them, and unifies the unit. And therefore the fact that the entire squad was being ignored by command personnel and political workers, that they were not providing incentive for the men's military labor, was particularly distressing. This resulted in the men being indifferent and sluggish.

Discussing the matter with the political worker and the party bureau secretary, I decided to raise this question at a party meeting. A serious, frank discussion ensued. It forced some party-member officers to take a somewhat different look at the indoctrinational significance of moral incentive and to make adjustments in their commander practices.

Moral incentive and its role was the subject of discussion at a commander training class and at an NCO conference. Battalion headquarters proceeded closely to monitor utilization by officers and lower-echelon commanders of their disciplinary powers pertaining to encouraging subordinates.

At a recent training exercise I observed the actions of a squad under the command of Sgt N. Strashkevich. The motorized riflemen were working on weapon field stripping and reassembly performance standards. I observed that the commander and every one of his men were accomplishing the task faster than the standard time. The drill was being carried out with enthusiasm. Competing with one another, the men helped each other and gave sincere congratulations to the winners.

Both Strashkevich and his men show equal desire in shooting and driving vehicles, in preparing for political training classes, and practice drill procedures on the parade ground.... Today this is a genuinely harmonious, cohesive military collective, the labor of which is properly graded and stimulated.

Our party organization is the largest among battalion-equivalent subunits. This fact of course has expanded possibilities of working with individuals and has helped intensify our efforts at strengthening military comradeship. In each company we have party members living in the barracks. They -- these are compulsory-service enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers -- are constantly with the men, influencing their fellow servicemen by word and deed. Young

party members company Komsomol organization secretary Pfc S. Larivoshin, Komsomol group organizer Sgt A. Logvin, Sr Sgt V. Balashov, and Pvt N. Vasyukov have proven to be precisely this kind of party member. In carrying out their military duty, battalion subunit personnel emulate these outstanding performers in combat and political training and socialist competition leaders; Komsomol members, taking an example from them, instill in themselves ideological conviction, right-mindedness, and implacability toward deficiencies.

Our battalion is excellent rated, and at regimental headquarters they acknowledge that its party and Komsomol organizations are the most aggressive and have the most initiative in the entire unit. But it is the general opinion of our party collective that what has been achieved is not a limit. Analyzing experience in combat training and competition, we also see unutilized reserve potential and deficiencies. In the matter of increasing the effectiveness of socialist competition, for example. Commanders have lost sight of the fact that in competing subunits it is possible to conduct joint sessions for summing up the performance results of each training drill, where the competition rivals clearly see each other's strong and weak points, analyze them, and are able to come to one another's aid.

Convinced that an important common goal -- the struggle to earn the title of excellent battalion -- has unified our collective, we specified for the new training year even more ambitious performance levels in combat improvement. And our friendship and comradely mutual assistance are becoming even stronger; commanders and political workers, Communists and Komsomol members, and all battalion personnel, focusing toward even more persistent labor, are storming new heights of combat readiness.

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NAVAL FORCES

OFFICERS' PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL AWARENESS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SII in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 37-42

[Article, published under the heading "The Officer's Pedagogic Skill: Experience, Problems, Opinions," by Candidate of Psychological Sciences Capt 1st Rank O. Tomashko: "Psychological-Pedagogic Caliber of Officers: For Classes in the Commander Training System"*]

[Text] It seems that Sn I. Kozub had firmly established the reputation of an incorrigible. His military service was not going well. He would do things like returning late from leave and being careless or negligent on watch. Increasing numbers of disciplinary actions were added to his record. And apparently few people on board ship noted that each new punishment cooled his ardor even more, diminishing his already meager desire to rectify the situation. Finally the new department head, Capt-Lt Yu. Odintsov, succeeded in putting an end to all this.

After he had gotten to know his subordinate and after talking to him, he once instructed the seaman to prepare visual aids for training classes in his military occupational specialty. Two small diagrams were required. On the following day Kozub announced that the work was completed. The officer entered the compartment and saw that the seaman had prepared two additional functional diagrams. He had made them at his own initiative.

That evening, when summarizing the day's performance, Captain-Lieutenant Odintsov cited Kozub as an example to his shipmates. Kozub fairly lit up with joy at these words. And this was that same Kozub who had seemed to be totally indifferent toward everything pertaining to his navy experience.

Soon the officer assigned the sailor another task. This was followed by still another. He checked to see how conscientious Kozub was about carrying them out. Odintsov did everything he could, in line with the requirements of the

* To assist personnel studying the following topic within the commander training system: "Improving the Psychological-Pedagogic Caliber of Commanders and Political Workers -- One of the Most Important Conditions of Strengthening Military Discipline."

Disciplinary Regulations, not to break the thread of mutual relationship which had begun linking him with his subordinate.

After this, many people on the ship acknowledged that Kozub had begun changing literally before their very eyes. Formerly he had tried to keep out of the way, to avoid "extra" work, while now he frequently would come up on his own initiative, ask questions, and suggest what he felt was a better solution to a given problem. He became more disciplined. He became more demanding on himself.

Thus the officer had found a way to approach this sailor and had succeeded, selecting the correct method of influence, in removing him from the "incorrigible" category. We should note that this has not been the only success in his career. During his years of service on board ship Captain-Lieutenant Odintsov has proven himself to be not merely a hardworking officer who is constantly enriching his professional skills and who shows concern for his men, but also an indoctrinator of high pedagogic caliber.

There is of course a specific mechanism and pattern in the fact that this officer, who is characterized as a person of high pedagogic standards, quickly finds a way to solve many problems, a way which proves to be the most expedient and consequently the most effective under the given specific conditions. An important role here is played by his knowledge, his practical experience and, most important, his desire, his endeavor to find and use the most effective approach for the sake of achieving results, in establishing discipline and order.

We once witnessed the following situation: following an inspection by a panel of officers sent from higher headquarters, the battalion was subjected to strong criticism for maintenance of equipment. They ordered the commanding officer, Maj V. Podol'skiy, to look thoroughly into the matter, to punish the guilty parties and to correct deficiencies. Podol'skiy realized that this would be easy to do. But he also realized that recently a great many good and positive things had been accomplished in the subunit. The men should be praised for this. How should he approach his examination of the state of affairs, and how should he word the subsequent order?

The battalion commander found a solution. The best specialists in the subunits, who had achieved good results at the time of the inspection, were praised, while the persons to blame for the deficiencies noted by the panel officers were punished. In his statement Major Podol'skiy succeeded in substantiating every action he had taken, wording the critique in such a manner that none of those present felt resentment or bitterness. The objectivity in appraising both successes and shortcomings, the very form of its communication to personnel, and the tone of the discussion which was held evoked a favorable response in the unit and helped achieve a radical improvement. This was the result of skillfully and intelligently applied indoctrinational measures.

Practical experience has long since proven that a high level of pedagogic ability is by no means guaranteed together with handing an officer a diploma upon completion of studies at a military educational institution. At the service school or academy he naturally can master and does master a certain sum total of knowledge in the field of psychology and education science, and he does

learn skills in directing a military unit, in conducting training classes and drills, and in organizing party-political, mass cultural, sports and other activities. He receives recommendations on how best to organize a discussion with subordinates and how more successfully to organize indoctrination work with individuals. But high pedagogic standards should be displayed in all this, which are acquired through personal practical experience, through one's own efforts, one's own persistence and desire. The last item in this list can apparently be considered one of the most important elements, for nothing useful is obtained without sincere desire and without realized need.

The range of tasks performed by today's officer is extremely broad. As an active implementer of Communist Party policy in the army and navy, he carries CPSU ideas into the military masses on a daily basis and does everything possible to increase their professional and social activeness, to mobilize the will and energy of his subordinates for successful accomplishment of everything faced by the subunit, unit, and warship. Among the aggregate of tasks, one of the most important, as we know, is further strengthening of military discipline and organization. In this domain the officer, as a champion of strict observance of regulations, should use all methods and forms of influencing subordinates and those around him to establish proper relations and highly disciplined conduct in the performance of all activities. His pedagogic standard in implementing decisions, in his approach to others and, finally, toward himself, his own words and deeds plays an exceptionally important role and opens up extensive reserve potential.

We find in the scholarly literature the statement that the pedagogic standards of an officer-indoctrinator constitute a manifestation, in the style of all his activities, of a synthesis of knowledge and views, convictions and skills, ethics and professional-teaching qualities. Consequently educational awareness as a complex entity is characterized first and foremost by skilled selection of the most expedient and effective forms and measures for teaching, indoctrinating and guiding personnel.

It is not our purpose in this article to demonstrate the entire complexity of the structure of an officer's educational awareness or to describe how various of its elements may be manifested in actual practice. There is special literature devoted to this subject. In this article we feel that it is important and necessary to stress just a few ideas, and particularly the idea that educational awareness does not comprise isolated acts of manifestation of pedagogically expedient actions in work with personnel. It is an entire system of such actions, which essentially permeate the entire training and indoctrination process, all forms and methods of influencing military personnel.

One of the principal elements of pedagogic knowledgeability is the ability and -- we emphasize this word -- the desire of an officer to maintain at all times in practical activities with subordinates and those around him properly demanding relations, and at the same time equable and close relations which do not injure people's honor and personal dignity. It is not mere happenstance that many officers are of the opinion that such relations constitute the foundation of indoctrination. They should not be destroyed or sacrificed to the occasion, to one's own emotions or psychological mood. Normal, close

interpersonal relations, and particularly between superiors and subordinates, are the foundation of success in indoctrination.

Are we always aware of this fact and do we personally strive to maintain such relations? And if we do, why is it that sometimes we are unable to achieve good mutual understanding and create solid, effective contact between ourselves and subordinates? Let us endeavor first of all to determine just what it means to destroy this contact of mutual understanding. For the sake of convenience we shall examine several situations which actually took place.

The conduct of Private Maksimov, who was guilty of absence without leave, was being discussed at a Komsomol meeting. After many others had spoken, the subunit commander took the floor. He stated in conclusion: "The previous speakers have already stressed that the Maksimov incident is not an isolated case. Several months ago Private Yegorov sullied his honor in just such a fashion. You all know about this. I would not like the number of such persons in our subunit to increase. I ask you all to draw the proper conclusions...."

The meeting adjourned. The following morning it was learned that Private Yegorov once again had left the company area without permission. Why? How was his behavior to be explained?

First of all the officer of course should not have stressed in his statements Yegorov's poor conduct in the past. In recent months he had changed much for the better. His efforts had been noticed. He had received a commendation for vigilant performance of guard duty. This constituted, as it were, an additional impetus to improve his conduct. The fact that at meetings and when summarizing performance results the commanding officer had stopped naming Yegorov among the worst performers also helped him feel better about himself and, as the psychologists put it, feel more comfortable. Yegorov was grateful for this: he straightened out to an even greater degree, endeavoring to consolidate the feeling of trust which the officer seemed to be expressing with his attitude toward him.

And suddenly the still shaky, tentative bridge of mutual understanding and trust which had been built between indoctrinator and subordinate was demolished by the indoctrinator himself. It was destroyed by just a single thoughtless statement, which had offended the soldier.

It is not necessary to state that an officer possessing a high degree of educational awareness would have paid greater attention to his words at the meeting. In any case, even having mentioned the soldier's misdeed, he would have endeavored to maintain a good attitude in him, making it clear that those around him had faith in him, believed in him, saw him as supporting the positive accomplishments of the subunit. Unfortunately the commanding officer failed in this.

Let us analyze another example.

Seaman Rogov received a letter from his friends at the plant where he had been employed. The letter contained some puzzling news about Lena, a girl with whom

he had been friends. He had his own future plans for Lena, and therefore the sailor decided to phone home to find out just exactly what the story was. On the next liberty day he went to his commanding officer: "Comrade senior lieutenant, request permission to go into town today. I have to make a long-distance call...."

The officer abruptly cut him off: "Don't even ask for liberty. You haven't earned it. Yesterday you were late responding to reveille. Today you received a demerit for a poor job of policing your bunk area. You want liberty? Get out of here!"

We shall not go into whether or not the commanding officer was right or wrong in refusing to allow the sailor to go on liberty. His decision was based on a certain foundation. At the same time, however, I believe that if the commanding officer had been guided by pedagogic sensitivity, he could have acted somewhat differently, showing greater attentiveness and reasonableness toward his subordinate's request. In any case we are convinced that in such a situation an experienced indoctrinator would have found a more correct solution, a solution suggested by his pedagogic awareness.

Let us ask a question: what is the secret behind the fact that one officer, even in a difficult situation, is able to avoid unnecessary aggravation of relations with subordinates, while another officer is unable to do so? In our opinion the main reason lies in a disinclination to have a fine sense of what others are feeling, an inability to look into the innermost recesses of another's heart and to make decisions in conformity with this. An officer's educational awareness is manifested precisely in communication and interaction with others.

The ability to understand others of course does not come easily. It is a result of painstaking work on oneself. And yet what a bright, joyous feeling one experiences when one realizes that he has succeeded in looking into the heart, the inner world of a subordinate. What one sees helps one maintain mutual understanding, the requisite firmness of job-related and personal relations and helps strengthen discipline and achieve higher-quality accomplishment of all job-related tasks.

The battalion under the command of Gds Maj A. Ryabov is rightly considered to be one of the finest in the airborne forces. Its personnel are distinguished by a high degree of combat proficiency, bold and determined actions at tactical exercises, by organization and discipline. One of the most important conditions which for many years now have assured this subunit success both in socialist competition and in accomplishing other practical tasks is the fact that an atmosphere of demandingness in conformity with regulations has been established, which permeates the entire process of training and indoctrination of personnel. And this demandingness is implemented at the highest level of educational awareness, displayed both by the commanding officer and by many other officers.

Gds Maj A. Ryabov relies skillfully on the battalion party and Komsomol organizations and on the force of public opinion in the campaign to maintain solid observance of regulations and firm military discipline. Here also desirable results cannot be achieved without proper educational awareness. It constitutes

that assistance or, more properly stated, that instrument thanks to which the commanding officer has achieved a great deal.

The military, as a social organism of our society, is a specific organization. Everything in the military is organized on a strict subordinational relationship, on the necessity of certain individuals subordinating themselves to their superiors, executing their will, with the latter directing and controlling units, subunits, warships, issuing instructions, orders and commands. In education science the act of directly addressing the subordinate with a corresponding demand or order is called the direct-action method. And we are accustomed to having this method operating smoothly in the military. An order has the force of law for subordinates. It shall be carried out unconditionally. But in one's daily activities it is also very frequently necessary to accomplish tasks and handle routine matters which do not require the peremptory order. Very important here is the ability to determine on each occasion the most expedient form of issuing instructions and to find the way to establish mutual understanding with others. When put to the test, however, it turns out that some officers are simply incapable of handling such a task. They do not know how to do it. And they do not teach themselves this ability.

Nor do such officers give thought to the fact that the direct-action method is essentially an act of forcing one to carry out the will of a superior. But as practical experience shows, the authority to give orders can be utilized in various ways. This is why experienced officers always endeavor to follow the rule given by eminent Soviet educator A. S. Makarenko, who stated that he did not begin to feel that he was a real teacher until he learned to say the phrase "come here" with from 15 to 20 different shades of intonation.

In other words, when A. S. Makarenko gave an order to any specific pupil, he would take into consideration the specific features of the situation, the nature of the task, the state of the young person, and he would consider the latter's attitude toward his teacher at that moment. His pedagogic sensitivity and expertise were manifested precisely in this.

I foresee an objection: "But that is Makarenko! One can hardly expect every officer to possess equal skill."

That is true. But should we not seek to this achieve this goal?

There is one more detail I would like to stress, bearing in mind excellent results on the part of an officer's indoctrinational efforts. When demanding something or recommending certain actions, an officer appears before his subordinates on the one hand as an official invested with appropriate authority, and on the other hand as a bearer of certain ethical standards and rules of human intercourse. Here too failure sometimes occurs. An officer fails to achieve the stated objective, even with properly manifested educational awareness. Why is this? It turns out that in this instance educational awareness was not reinforced morally. A subordinate responding to the demands of his superior, as a rule compares: does the officer himself follow these demands? Living according to one set of rules and requiring that others follow a different set of rules, even if dictated by the interests of the cause at hand --

this has never produced desirable results. Consequently the possibility of achieving conscientious follow-through and discipline on the part of subordinates occurs only when an officer does not forget that educational awareness should be combined with his high degree of moral authority. In confirmation of this thought, the following incident is frequently cited in literature on education science and psychology. A highly prominent medical scientist said to his students: "When you give aspirin, it is merely aspirin, but when I give it, it is a most powerful healing agent, because it is a medicinal remedy plus my prestige...."

This is why many officers are correct in stating that the commander's prestige and authority constitute a guarantee of the success of all undertakings, a guarantee of achievement of a high degree of discipline on the part of subordinates and, finally, a guarantee of effective indoctrination work. And it is no particular secret that a high degree of prestige and authority is possessed only by that teacher who in working with people has the ability to influence them in an optimal fashion, to influence them painlessly both for the cause at hand, for those around him, and for himself. In those cases, however, when something is done pedagogically incorrectly, unintelligently, there is revealed not simply the lack of an officer's pedagogic preparedness as a leader and indoctrinator of his men, but frequently there is also revealed a lack of prestige and authority among his subordinates on the part of such an officer.

...Once a young seaman accidentally dropped a test instrument while performing maintenance operations in a ship's sonar room. His foot slipped, and he fell on a cardboard carton containing tools. Fortunately the test instrument was not damaged. But nevertheless was this an act of negligence? Yes, it was. That is, some response by the instructor is called for. It should be an intelligent response, however, but the officer who was present and witnessed the incident was unable to control himself. He became angry and chewed out the enlisted man. Immediately the atmosphere in the room changed: the enthusiasm of the men working side by side evaporated like smoke. It was as if they had been replaced by other personnel. Work continued in painful silence.

Thus it sometimes happens that a momentary outburst of irritation or anger covers the eyes of an ill-starred instructor, and he no longer sees anything good in his subordinate, seeing only a misdeed or act of negligence committed by him. Behind the inability to contain oneself and to find the correct words or requisite intonation there is also a lack of a certain educational awareness on the part of an official. Observing such incidents, one cannot help but see how little is required sometimes to ruin a good mood. We should not forget that personal interrelations permeate our interaction on the job, in some instances filling it with the warmth of trust and mutual liking, while in other instances surrounding it with cold indifference. And such coolness and hostility frequently arise (in any case can arise) on the basis of a single ill-considered step taken by an instructor or a rude word addressed to a subordinate.

And what if such actions are not simply a sudden, isolated impetuous outburst? What if this is already becoming typical of a given officer? What can one expect in such a case?

Each day an officer gets together with his men and organizes activities pertaining to training and indoctrination of military personnel. He does this for the purpose of maintaining his subunit, unit, or warship at a high level of combat readiness. The officer teaches a great deal first and foremost by his example, his direct actions. A high degree of professionalism on the part of the instructor does more than anything else to accelerate the process of development of his subordinates. And this professionalism mandatorily presupposes a high degree of educational awareness.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

INDOCTRINATION LECTURE: THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 83 (signed to press 19 Jan 83) pp 73-77

[Article, published under the heading "International Topics," by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Selivanov: "Intrigues of U.S. Imperialism in Latin America"]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1980's Latin America has been going through a new stage in the evolution of the antiimperialist struggle. This has been marked first and foremost by an upsurge in the national liberation movement of peoples, with involvement of the most extensive social strata of society. Marching in the front ranks of the liberation struggle are the worker class and its political parties, which consistently advocate doing away with the oppression of foreign monopolies, primarily U.S. monopolies, and implementation of profound socioeconomic reforms in the interests of laboring people. There is also occurring a steady growth in the role of the worker class and its political parties in solving foreign-policy problems, the most important of which at the present time for the working people of the countries of Latin America are confrontation of the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism, the campaign to preserve peace, deepening of international détente, and holding the arms race in check on that continent.

Of great importance for an upsurge in the antiimperialist movement is strengthening of the economic and political independence of the Latin American countries, which is dictated by an appreciable growth of their influence in international affairs. Aggravation of conflicts between the nations of Latin America and U.S. imperialism has become a most important consequence of this.

An entire chain of events, which have become major landmarks of the revolutionary movement of the Latin American peoples in recent decades, has led to a substantial weakening in the U.S. position in Latin America. These include the victorious Cuban Revolution and the subsequent revolutionary upsurge of the mid-1960's, the revolutionary democratic reforms in Peru, Bolivia, and Panama at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's, the Chilean revolution of 1970-1973, and the powerful upsurge of the mass liberation movement in the countries of Central America at the end of the 1970's, which was marked by the victory of the Sandinista popular revolution in Nicaragua.

All these events of great historic significance took place in conditions of an intensive contest between progressive forces in Latin America on the one hand and, on the other, U.S. imperialism acting in concert with local Latin American reactionaries. The United States has used and is using an extensive arsenal of economic, political, ideological, and military means in the struggle to maintain its position on that continent and for the possibility of continuing exploitation of the Latin American peoples and robbing them of their national wealth. Military means have always played a decisive role. A popular democratic uprising in the Dominican Republic in 1965, revolutionary actions in Bolivia in 1968, and the revolution in Chile in 1973 were crushed by force of arms. U.S. imperialism also attempted to crush the Cuban Revolution in 1961 by military force.

With the aim of organizing and coordinating military actions against the liberation movement in Latin America, during the course of many years Washington was building and improving an enormous military-political mechanism, the mission of which was to defend the position and interests of the U.S. monopolies in the countries of Latin America -- the so-called inter-American military system. The foundations of this system were laid in 1947 with the signing of the notorious Rio Treaty, which virtually presented the United States with the possibility of armed intervention in the affairs of the Latin American countries when Washington saw fit to do so.

Washington expended considerable effort directed toward strengthening the inter-American military and political system at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, when a powerful upsurge in the liberation movement began in many countries of Latin America. Precisely at that time the military doctrine of "counterinsurgency activities" was forced upon the armed forces of the Latin American countries. In conformity with this doctrine the Latin American armies, which were virtually under the control of U.S. military missions and military advisers, were turned into a punitive force, which savagely crushed any actions by the working people. Hundreds of thousands of Latin American military personnel, under the guidance of U.S. instructors, received special "counterinsurgency" training and anti-Communist brainwashing at military training facilities in the United States and Latin America. More than 30,000 military personnel from various Latin American countries were subjected to such brainwashing just at the Americas School in Panama. The Inter-American Defense Council (IDC), with headquarters in Washington, was also actively operating during that period. It prepared manuals on crushing revolutionary toiler uprisings in countries south of the Rio Grande and held regular conferences of commanders in chief of the branches of service of the Latin American countries. The U.S. Southern Command, which is still headquartered in Panama, monitored the overall military-political situation throughout Latin America. It has at its disposal substantial U.S. forces, including special "Green Beret" units, which have been involved on numerous occasions in punitive operations at "hot spots" in the Latin American region.

Washington placed particular hopes on the so-called Central American Defense Council (CADC), which it had put together. This alliance between the military and the police, which included the reactionary dictator regimes in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, for a period of almost two decades crushed

popular uprisings in those countries. Punitive actions were conducted under the guidance of experts from the Pentagon and CIA. In Washington CADC was considered to be a highly effective instrument for protecting the interests of the U.S. monopolies in Central America and a "model" for the possible future organization of similar military-political blocs in other parts of Latin America.

This entire vast mechanism of the inter-American military system, however, the purpose of which is to keep a tight rein on Latin American, began clearly revealing its lack of effectiveness by the 1970's. Even those Latin American military personnel who had been "brainwashed" at U.S. military training centers were no longer knuckling under to the Pentagon. Military regimes which had come into power in Bolivia, Peru, and Panama implemented a number of reforms which were of an anti-imperialist, democratic character. Military leaders in Brazil and Argentina were drafting national military doctrines which pursued the interests of their own countries, without any concern for the strategists in the Pentagon.

When the pro-American Somoza regime in Nicaragua began to stagger under the blows of a popular revolution, the Latin American countries categorically refused Washington's entreaties to send in so-called inter-American forces to subdue the insurgent people. The joint force made up of troops from the armies of the CADC member countries, on which Washington was counting particularly heavily, was unable to act openly to save the Somoza regime, which was in its death throes. This fact clearly demonstrated that the repressive U.S. military machine in Central America had begun to slip.

The crisis of inter-American relations, including that of the military system, which had long been moving to a head, was most clearly manifested during the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in the South Atlantic (April-June 1982). In the course of this conflict the United States betrayed Argentina, its Rio Treaty ally, by openly siding with and supporting Great Britain, its NATO imperialist ally. The influential U.S. newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR stated the following: "It would be no exaggeration to state that U.S. policy in Latin America is presently lying in ruins due to U.S. support of the British.... The vote in the Organization of American states, when 17 members voted in support of Argentina (nobody voted against), brought down like a house of cards a system which had been laboriously constructed over the course of 35 years." "The alienation of Latin America from the United States," the newspaper continued, "is not some transient phenomenon. It was not evoked by the Falklands crisis; this crisis merely clearly demonstrated this alienation."

During the days of the tragic events surrounding the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), Latin Americans became convinced once and for all that Washington was using the Rio Pact, the inter-American military system, and the Organization of American States (OAS) only in its own selfish interests, ignoring the interests of the Latin American countries. It had also become quite obvious that a Latin American solidarity had been born and become strong in recent years, including in military affairs. This is indicated by the following fact: the governments of Venezuela and Peru declared that they would give military assistance to Buenos Aires in case of a British attack on the continental part of Argentina.

Numerous undisguised attacks by a number of statesmen and military leaders of Latin American countries against the very foundation of the inter-American military system -- the Rio Treaty -- were graphic manifestations of the crisis within this system. Ecuadoran President Larrea Hurtado declared, for example, that the tragic events in the South Atlantic had graphically shown that "our security is unreliable and chancy," that the Latin American countries should revise the existing "collective defense system." Lt Gen Ernan Poluarte, Peruvian army chief of staff, demanded "immediate revision of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty (the Rio Treaty -- V.S.) without U.S. participation."

In May 1982 the Latin American countries, with the exception of Chile and Colombia, turned down a U.S. invitation to take part in the traditional naval exercises code-named "Unidas." These exercises had been held on a regular basis since 1960 and had served as one of the means of subordinating the naval forces of the Latin American countries to the so-called U.S. "ocean strategy," to which the Pentagon attaches particular importance.

The many manifestations of the crisis in U.S. military and political relations with its southern neighbors are doing appreciable detriment to the very foundations of the Reagan Administration's Latin American policy, for since this administration came into office it has assigned a most important role to measures of a military nature in resolving international problems.

We should note that the White House attempted to place its Latin American policy on a so-called "scientific" foundation. Washington considers the document titled "New Inter-American Policy for the 1980's," also known as the "Santa Fe Document" (named after the policy drafting team, who called themselves the "Santa Fe Committee"), as such a foundation. This "scientific" opus, which has become the Reagan Administration's guide to action in inter-American affairs, was drawn up by a team of political scientists, such as R. Fonteyn, (R. Doksey, L. Tambs). Others included military men, such as retired general G. Sumner, who headed the Inter-American Defense Council in 1975-1979. In spite of this, the "Santa Fe Document" reveals not only a lack of understanding of the most obvious historical and social processes taking place in Latin America but also contains erroneous data on the present state of inter-American affairs. At the same time it is of a bluntly anti-Communist and misanthropic character. It is not surprising that it was characterized in the world press as "making one's flesh crawl."

In fact, the "Santa Fe Document" spells out in black and white: "Foreign policy" is an instrument with the aid of which peoples endeavor to ensure their survival in a hostile world. War, not peace, is the norm in international relations." Proceeding from a position of inveterate anticommunism, the United States is directed to carry out aggressive actions as soon as possible. The detailed recommendations contained in this "document" in regard to "new" U.S. inter-American policy for the 1980's reflect a frankly militarist approach to international problems. Measures connected with strengthening the military component of the inter-American system (the Rio Treaty and the Inter-American Defense Council) are stressed. The Washington Administration is counseled to supplement the Rio Treaty with a number of new, subregional military alliances -- in the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, etc. It is recommended that "joint defense" be bolstered by enlisting Canada in military cooperation with the Latin American

countries and by expanding military assistance programs to all "legitimate governments" which have been subjected to "threat" by "international communism."

"Adventurism, willingness to gamble the vital interests of mankind for the sake of one's own narrow, selfish aims," stress the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress, "are particularly glaringly manifested in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles. Demonstrating total disregard for the rights and aspirations of peoples, they are attempting to portray the liberation struggle of the masses as a manifestation of 'terrorism.' They have in truth set for themselves the goal of achieving the unattainable -- to place a barrier in the path of progressive changes in the world and to regain the role of rulers of the destiny of peoples."

The increased military presence in Latin America and adjacent waters which is being carried out by the present U.S. Administration is fully in conformity with the adventuristic recommendations of the "Santa Fe Document." Attempts were stepped up to put together new military blocs with the participation of Latin American countries.

At the beginning of the 1980's the thrust of Washington's militaristic actions began to shift increasingly more clearly into the Central American region. The U.S. Administration is trying here to find a replacement for the ignominiously collapsed CADC punitive bloc. At a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica held in mid-1982, an official statement was made announcing the establishment of a military-political grouping in the region to be called the "Central American Democratic Community." Guatemala also joined this alliance. The declaration announcing its formation stated the intention to resist the "Marxist conspiracy" in Central America. There is no doubt whatsoever that this bloc will operate according to the instructions of the Pentagon and the CIA and will be armed with U.S. weapons. Its main function is to defend the interests of U.S. imperialism in Central America and to crush the anti-imperialist movements of the peoples of the countries of this region.

Last summer it was learned that there were plans to form still another military-political bloc in the Caribbean Basin. At the beginning of November 1982 the Latin American press reported that the heads of a number of small Caribbean island nations had signed a treaty calling for the establishment of a so-called "regional security and defense system." This new military bloc included Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, and Saint Lucia. The actual organizers of this alliance -- the United States and Great Britain -- immediately granted 40 million dollars to the member countries. Many Latin American observers believe, and not without reason, that the aim of this "regional security and defense system" will be to strangle the growing liberation movement. The formation of police forces, to be under a unified command, is specifically for this aim. The reactionary nature of the new military organization is indicated by the fact that Grenada, which has taken the road of independent development, was not permitted to join.

Increasing its military presence in Latin America, Washington relies on an extensive system of military bases (more than 50) established in various parts of

the region. The majority of these are located in the Caribbean and Central America. The largest complexes of military facilities are in Panama, on the island of Puerto Rico and adjacent smaller islands.

According to information in a working document prepared by the UN Secretariat, the Virgin Islands are being turned into a U.S. military strategic bridgehead. The document states that the Pentagon already maintains a large naval base on the island of Saint Thomas. In addition, it has established radar installations and a sonar detection station on the island of Santa Cruz, as well as a naval gunnery range in the vicinity. This range is used for warship trials and holding naval exercises.

U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger stated in testimony before the House committees on defense appropriations and the military that preparations were in full swing for constructing military bases in a number of countries in the Caribbean region. In particular, negotiations are in progress between the United States and Haitian dictator Duvalier on granting sites in Haiti for building several U.S. military bases.

In this same regard a statement was made by U.S. Department of State official spokesman Fisher on a decision by the U.S. Government to renovate and build on Honduran and Colombian soil several air bases for use by U.S. military aircraft. In addition, the Reagan Administration intends to use for its own purposes a naval base which is being built by Colombia on the island of San Andres. This island is situated in the western Caribbean, only 200 kilometers from the coast of Nicaragua, against which the United States is planning military intervention.

In its endeavors to expand the network of military bases, which would maintain control over the Latin American countries, the United States also intends to utilize the results of the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the South Atlantic. The Argentine magazine SEMANA stated that militarization of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) by establishing there either a U.S. or joint NATO military base was one of the main items on the agenda during the talks held in London in mid-1982 between U.S. President Reagan and British Prime-Minister M. Thatcher.

Escalating its aggressive policy in Latin America, the U.S. Administration is stepping up support of military-dictator regimes, particularly the Pinochet junta in Chile, the Stroessner regime in Paraguay, the Uruguayan and a number of other governments.

Honduras is rapidly being transformed into an important bridgehead for U.S. military expansion in Central America. In 1983 Washington will increase military assistance to Honduras by 40 percent over the preceding year and will send to that country an additional number of military advisers. Last year the Reagan Administration gave the Honduran regime 10.5 million dollars to purchase weapons and various military equipment. Plans also call for allocating an additional 17 million dollars in carrying out the U.S. President's so-called "Caribbean initiative" -- a program to boost aid to puppet governments in the region.

Washington has spent millions of dollars on building special military bases in Honduras to form and train units made up of former members of Somoza's National Guard who had fled from Nicaragua, in order to train them in the use of U.S. weapons. These detachments are mounting acts of armed provocation against independent Nicaragua on a steadily increasing scale.

Large-scale joint maneuvers by U.S. and Honduran forces were held on Honduran soil in July 1982, code-named "Combined Movement." The area encompassed by the maneuvers covered virtually the entire section of the country adjacent to the border with Nicaragua. The exercise scenario called for C-130 transport aircraft to provide an air bridge between the exercise area and the port of Puerto Lempira on the Caribbean coast, to which large military units arrived from the United States. The press in a number of Latin American countries assessed these maneuvers as a "dress rehearsal for military intervention" against Nicaragua.

The Reagan Administration allocated 19 million dollars for the establishment of a corps of 1,500 Latin American mercenaries to invade Nicaragua. Reports are appearing in the foreign press to the effect that preparations are being made for direct U.S. military intervention against Nicaragua. Detachments of Pentagon "Green Berets" are being redeployed to countries adjoining Nicaragua, where base camps are being set up. U.S. helicopter gunships and logistic support units are already in place. U.S. destroyers and guided missile patrol craft are on continuous patrol off the coasts of Nicaragua.

Crude pressure exerted by Washington on Nicaragua, however, cannot intimidate the heroic Nicaraguan people and their government. The toilers are filled with resolve to defend the achievements of their revolution. The sympathies and support of all peace-loving peoples are on their side.

The patriots of El Salvador, under the leadership of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FLN), are waging a selfless armed struggle against the reactionary pro-American regime. Here too Washington is doing everything it can to drown in blood the liberation struggle of the masses. The United States is giving steadily increasing military assistance to the Salvadoran junta. As the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES recently reported, in a period of 20 months the United States has spent more than 125 million dollars for militarist support of the Salvadoran Government, which amounts, according to calculations by the newspaper's observers, to approximately 6,000 dollars per soldier of the government forces. The Pentagon is supplying the junta with ground-attack aircraft which are specially equipped for anti-guerrilla punitive operations. More than 30 percent of the command personnel of the ruling junta's military forces are "advisers" from the United States. U.S. military authorities are providing mass training of Salvadoran army personnel in counterinsurgency operations. More than 2,000 men have received special training at U.S. military bases at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning. Salvadoran pilots are learning methods of employing napalm weapons at U.S. Air Force ranges in Panama.

U.S. militarist circles are advocating even more intensive escalation of military intervention in Latin America. ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, a weekly put out by the U.S. Department of Defense, for example, considers "patently inadequate" that which is being done in this regard in El Salvador. The magazine states

that what is essential is "more active U.S. intervention in the events which are taking place in El Salvador and other Latin American countries."

Stepping up its aggressive actions against the Latin American countries, the Reagan Administration is counting on the support of its NATO allies, since the predatory aims of the U.S. imperialists and the other NATO countries coincide in the Latin American region. It is no mere happenstance that for a number of years now NATO leaders have been talking about expanding the so-called "area of responsibility" of the NATO pact to the Latin American region. In actual fact NATO military activities are already in progress in this region. In March 1982, for example, large-scale NATO naval exercises, code-named "Safe Pass-82," were held in the Gulf of Mexico and adjacent waters. Forces involved included as many as 30 U.S., British, Canadian, West German, Dutch, and Belgian combatant ships and auxiliary vessels, more than 80 shore-based patrol aircraft and naval helicopters of these countries, and more than 10,000 military personnel. These maneuvers were held at the very height of a campaign of threats and blackmail being conducted by Washington against Cuba and Nicaragua. They also coincided with the beginning of the subsequent stage of punitive operations against insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. Also indicating the provocative thrust of these maneuvers was the fact that the principal operations were conducted in the Florida Strait -- in the immediate vicinity of the coast of socialist Cuba.

Another step attesting to intensification of U.S. aggressive policy in Latin America was passage of a resolution by the U.S. Senate in August 1982 "authorizing" the Reagan Administration to resort to any necessary means, including the use of weapons, under the phony pretext of a "Cuban threat." The draft resolution was introduced by Republican Senator Simms and is known as the "Simms Amendment." What is actually involved is organization of direct armed intervention by the United States for the purpose of overthrowing the Cuban Government, an attempt to turn back the course of history and to return the Cuban people to those times when U.S. imperialism totally dominated that island. "This 'amendment'," stated the Cuban newspaper GRANMA, "means counting even more heavily on a policy 'from a position of strength' -- the only policy which the present U.S. Administration recognizes. It opens up the door for an interventionist adventure by U.S. imperialism. Only in the atmosphere which is prevailing in the White House could a resolution have been passed with the aid of which the United States, demonstrating complete imperial disregard for the sovereignty of its neighbors south of the Rio Grande, is once again attempting to brandish a 'big stick' over their heads."

It is quite obvious that U.S. imperialism, attempting to maintain and expand its position in Latin America, as in other regions of the world, is willing to commit any and all criminal acts. However, the times when a "big stick" policy and bloody terror tactics against peoples brought success to the imperialist colonialists are irrevocably a thing of the past. "Today," stresses CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "peoples are advancing to the forefront of history as never before. They have gained a voice which nobody will be able to stifle."

Development of the liberation movement throughout the entire Latin American Continent and intensification of the struggle by peoples against the dictate of

U.S. monopoly capital, against local reactionaries, for democracy and social progress serve as vivid evidence of the fact that the anti-imperialist struggle of the Latin American peoples is assuming an increasingly larger scale and is supported by the growing solidarity of all progressive forces throughout the world.

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June 16, 1983